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**INTERNALISED SHAME AND RACIALISED IDENTITY IN SOUTH
AFRICA, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ‘COLOURED’
IDENTITY**

**A QUANTITATIVE STUDY AT TWO WESTERN CAPE
UNIVERSITIES**

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree Master of Arts
(Clinical Psychology), in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Cape
Town

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Hayley Julius

Student No.: JLSHAY001

Supervisor: A. / Professor C.G. Tredoux

DECLARATION

I, Hayley Julius (Student No.: JLSHAY001) do hereby declare that this work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signed in *University of Cape Town* (place) on the *twelfth* day of the *first* month in the year 2004.

Signed by candidate

Ms Hayley Julius

Student No: JLSHAY001

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She had mentioned her background but not said anything about it. It was possible that she belonged to a mixed community or stood in some other kind of half-and-half position. Something like that would explain her passion, the way she had read his book....

Half A Life, V.S. Naipul, 2001, 124

And, with respect for my parents to whom this would have been important

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INDEX OF TABLES

PAGE

Table1. Frequency table: ‘Race’	47
Table 2. ANOVA Summary table: Shame for only ‘black’, ‘white’, ‘coloured’.	50
Table 3. Differential relationships between strength of racial identification across ‘black’, ‘white’, and ‘coloured’, using Strength of Racial Identification Scale, $F(2.392)=19.070, p<0.00004$	53
Table 4. Differential relationships between strength of racial identification across ‘black’, ‘white’, and ‘coloured’, using CSE; $F(2.392)=24.317, p<0.00004$	53

INDEX OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Graph of cell mean plots: Shame total for only ‘black’, ‘white’, ‘coloured’.	50
Figure 2. ANOVA showing effect of racial identification for ‘black’, ‘white’, and ‘coloured’, using Strength of Racial Identification Scale.....	52
Figure 3. ANOVA showing effect of racial identification for ‘black’, ‘white’, and ‘coloured’; using CSE.	54

LIST OF APPENDICES	PAGE
Statement of Ethics.....	i
Research Instrument: Section A: Internalized Shame Scale (Cook, 2001)	ii
Section B: Strength of Racial Identification Scale, combining the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992) and the Bornman (1988) Scale.....	iii
Section C: Demographic Information.....	iv
Alpha Coefficient for Internalized Shame Scale.....	vi
Alpha Coefficient for Strength of Racial Identification Scale.....	vii
Exploratory Factor Analysis: supporting four factors for the CSE Scale.....	viii
Factor Loading for four factors of CSE Scale.....	viii
Exploratory Factor Analysis: supporting five factors for the Strength of Racial Identification Scale (CSE Scale and Bornman’s Scale).....	ix
Scree plot of five-factor model for the Strength of Racial Identification Scale (CSE Scale and Bornman’s Scale).....	x

CONTENTS

PAGE

Abstract.....ii

Chapter 1: Introduction.....1

Chapter 2: Literature Review.....8

Chapter 3: Methodology.....33

Chapter 4: Results.....46

Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion.....55

References.....64

ABSTRACT

Drawing on Social Identity Theory, with particular reference to racialisation in South Africa, this study looked at the significance of shame for a group of people who identify with the racially ascribed group of 'coloured'. It was also the purpose of the study to determine whether there were significant differences in shame amongst three groups of respondents who identified themselves as 'black', 'white', and 'coloured', as an indication of institutional apartheid's bastardisation of certain identities and the consequences thereof in self-conscious emotions. The sample consisted of 444 students at the University of Cape Town and the University of the Western Cape, with a 'racial' demographic breakdown of 131 'black' respondents, 136 'white' respondents, 132 'coloured' respondents, 11 'Indian' respondents, and 15 respondents who chose the option of 'other'. As the three major groups of interest was 'black', 'white', and 'coloured', and sample sizes of other groups were small, information for these latter groups were discarded.

The independent variable, strength of 'racial' identification across the 'race' categories of 'black', 'white', and 'coloured', was measured by a 24-item instrument comprising a 16-item Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992) that had been supplemented by 8 items from Bornman's (1988) racial identification scale. The dependent variable was shame and the Internalized Shame Scale (Cook, 2001) was used as a measure of this. A demographic questionnaire was compiled and respondents were asked to voluntarily respond to these three self-report measures in one sitting, administered in their lecture theatre during usual lecture times.

Correlation was initially used to analyse the data and this indicated that there was negligible correlation between shame and ascription to racialised identity. One-way analysis of variance was done in order to determine whether there was a significant difference in the level of shame between groups, and this was non-significant. There appeared to be high levels of variance for shame experience within the 'coloured' group and analysis of covariance was done in order to determine whether University, Monthly Household Income, or Language might account for this variance. Results indicated that these variables did not significantly account for the variance in shame in the 'coloured' group. Statistically significant results were found in strength of racialised identification across the groups, with all relationships being statistically different from each other (using only CSE as measure of racial identification). 'Black' respondents reported the strongest

levels of racial identification, with 'coloured' respondents showing significantly lower levels of racial identification than either 'black' or 'white' respondents did.

Several conjectures arise: with regard to shame that the discourse about a marginal, negative 'coloured' identity that introduces, and warrants, an experience of shame is unfounded. These results challenge discourse that suggests that those who ascribe to a 'coloured' identity are psychologically and emotionally more vulnerable to psychopathology than other groups due to oppressive apartheid governance systems which become internalised. Even though generational effect may be at work, results challenge the continued use of an understanding of a 'coloured' identity associated with feelings of marginalisation. The finding that the 'coloured' group evinces the lowest levels of racial identification speaks to alternative strategies than racialisation that may have been employed to contribute to a positive identity, and could be the starting point for research which examines this in the South African situation. However, methodological problems associated with the research limit the generalizability of the results.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

RESEARCH QUESTION

The aim of this research is the quantitative study of the *significance* of the experience of shame amongst a sample of students who identify themselves as 'coloured', 'black' and 'white'. The aim is to establish whether shame is a significant factor in the lives of young South Africans who ascribe to a particular racialised identity, namely 'coloured' identity. It has as its end the bringing of the dynamics of self-conscious emotions and their racialising in South Africa into the mainstream of psychology.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

i. Identity

For Erikson the development of shame is an integral part of identity development which occurs at the same time as the psychoanalytic concept of the anal phase, approximately between one-and-a-half and three years of age (Hooper, 1996). The Eriksonian concept of identity has been credited with providing psychology the term by which to define individual and communal awareness; a “‘sense of *invigorating sameness and continuity*’ (emphasis in original) ” (Erikson, 1996/1976, p. 60 in Helms, 1996, p. 152). This involves personal belief in a shared, similar and continuous world view, as well as fitting into a community through meeting social role requirements at a particular age of that society, through the shared, similar, and continuous nature of this (in Helms, 1996). Identity may also be seen as encapsulated in the notion of the formation of the sense of self and the development of narcissism. The “selfsameness and continuity to the ego’s synthesizing methods (in ego identity)” act as a way of “safeguarding the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for others” (Erikson, 1959, p.23), which is the essential understanding of identity for this work.

ii. Race

Through historical accounts, ‘race’ has been differentially defined by gene loading in the development of certain phenotypic traits. Thus, that social ‘race’ categories are biologically constructed (Gordon, 1976). However the idea of distinguishable phenotypic features arising from distinct ‘pure’ genes has been debunked, and neither do geographical locations convincingly

distinguish between locations of specific 'racial' groups (Jackson, 1992). The subjective categorisation of people in this manner has controlled their access to resources and also defined the way in which this would occur (in Helms, 1996). Helms (1994a) has argued for the term 'sociorace', in acknowledgement of the social prescriptive and arbitrary nature of this attribution. However, the implicit argument of this thesis is that in retaining notions of 'race', society then needs to be prepared to address the psychological consequences "of being socialized in a racially oppressive environment and the characteristics of self that develop in response to or in synchrony with either benefiting from or suffering under such oppression" (Helms, 1996, p. 147). This means dealing with the *racialised identity* that evolves from this and with the phenomenon of *shaming*, however necessary this turns out to be.

iii. **Racialised Identity**

The prescriptive and entrenched nature of the Apartheid structure has resulted in the perception that the individual belongs to a particular 'race' group, with effects both sociological and individual-psychological. This can be understood partly in terms of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Fraser, 1978, cited in Foster and Louw-Potgieter, 1991) where belonging to a distinct group enhances the identity and identification with that in-group, at the expense of the out-group. These may include racialised attitudes and discrimination based on beliefs in and of people whom one ascribes as belonging to a particular 'race' group. Readings of history where ascription to a racialised identity has been delineated (for example, World War II, Apartheid) have highlighted the value-laden nature of this identity (see for example, Gilman 1993 on the influence of the perception of Jewish identity on the formation of psychoanalytic theory).

Racial descriptions of 'black', 'white', 'coloured', etc. create the representations around physical markers of what it means to be thus. Brown and Lunt (2002) argue that it is the move from biology (individual) to race (social). They show this in the construction of gender and note that this process is underway "before any given individual represents gender to themselves as a 'set of relations'" (Brown and Lunt, 2002, p. 9). To further this; with 'racial' separation's entrenchment, people are not required to provide representations for themselves, but enter into existing racialised relationships in forms of description, knowledge, moral attributions, etc. In other words racialisation is a process of constructing 'racial' identities and meanings. However, this is but part understanding of the term racialisation that it wishes to denote. Barot and Bird (2001) quote Hesse (1997, p. 103, footnote 3), who identifies three levels of racialisation:

“the reduction of diverse cultures to the fixity of biological racism;
the hegemony of white culture and the denial of cultural dialogues;
and social conflicts around racism and racialized identities”

The first, standing alone, would be insufficient in constituting an understanding of racialised experience and requires the further two levels of penetration, yet without being able to recount the lived experience of a racialised body as Fanon (1991) has railed for and against. Fanon’s work, they argue, serves as a deterrent from abstraction of the experience of ‘racial’ oppression. This is important when noting the use of the concept *antiracism* in sociology (see, for example, Rattansi, 1995 and Barot and Bird, 2001). It is problematic to engage these terms when the body and the psyche are still employed in the act of oppression, though it may have moved from the ‘old’ form (meaning the body), to the ‘new’ form (meaning the gaze) of ‘race’ construction.

iv. Apartheid

It denotes a “racially structured system of inequality, functioning as a parliamentary democracy... at best paternalistically in relation to Africans, at worst coercively” (Welsh, 1994, p. 135). Thus, a policy formally instituted in South African law from 1948, of a ‘racially’ segregated social order. This was with the implicit intent, in all areas of living, to keep the white man the “master”, with the right to rule and keep South Africa the “white man’s country” (J. G. Strijdom, 1948, cited in Welsh, 1994, p. 139).

v. ‘Coloured’, ‘Black’, ‘White’

The terms ‘coloured’, ‘black’ and ‘white’ refer to apartheid-institutional tools for segregation of South African people. The uses of these terms is employed in the knowledge that they may be abused and reify oppression against any of these racialised groups, yet is inimical to the study’s attempt to understand the possible consequences of oppression on South African psyches. It also represents a respect for, and an understanding of the positive use that has been salvaged by groups that have made the choice of defining their struggle against oppression through a call to ‘race’ pride. As the author acknowledges the problematic, divisive and constructed nature of these terms, they have been delineated by quotation marks throughout the work.

vi. Shame

Stephen Pattison (2000), in attempting to draw together understandings of shame, determines that there are several dimensions that inform an approach to working with shame. He distinguishes an ontological shame: the inevitable shame of the human dilemma in finding oneself mortal and embodied. A second kind of shame may be normal and functional in the sense that it provides cohesion and boundaries between the self and the other, helping to maintain the order of social relationships (akin to the proposals of human developmental theory). Pattison (2000) also distinguishes between acute (functioning as a healthy warning signal), and chronic shame, that may dysfunctionally manifest within individuals or the communities within which they live. It is this latter manifestation that this thesis deals with. Pattison (2000) proposes that the shift has occurred from a distinction between social and psychological shame to a distinction between personal and psychological shame. However, this is not a clear distinction as he admits that “all shame is socially shaped” and that “groups of stigmatised and unwanted individuals can... experience a profound sense of shame and unwantedness” (Pattison, 2000, p.182). Thus, shame, as “spoiled, soiled identity” may be conscious or unconscious, and has social, psychological, personal, and physical antecedents and consequences that need to be addressed “by and within the human community if they are to live full and responsible lives” (2000, p. 184 – 185). In this sense shame is considered to be an agent that engages the individual actively (in, for example, avoidance, derogation), rather than a passively, which is an important proposal inherent in this research.

THE PROBLEM STATEMENT

There has been a poverty of contemporary debate on the experience of shame in relation to a racialised identity post 1994. Problematising a ‘coloured’ identity in particular, much of the comment and analysis on the ‘validity’ of such an identity in a post-Apartheid South Africa has been made by intellectuals (see for example, du Pré, 1997, Prinsloo, 1997a, 1997b). This has broadly encompassed academics and politicians, with little voice coming from those who claim this identity and have little access to mediums through which they can claim the experience of this identity. The shaming experience engendered through an adherence to this (for all purposes) non-identity (see for example Rappetti, 2002, Mammon, 2002, and Kamaldien, 2003) brings to the fore questions about an experience of the self that is possibly different to those of other ‘racial’ identifications in South Africa. An attempt is made to enter a research area that has

received scant attention in psychology in South Africa. The aim is to clarify the political psychology of shame where this traditionally psychoanalytic concept has been shown to provide a wealth of information about developmental process, socialisation and the implications for pro-social behaviour and therapeutic intervention (see Lutwak, Ferrari and Cheek, 1998; Tangney, 1996; Taylor, 1996; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher and Gramzow, 1992).

A RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH

- A psychological account of shame in a country where the majority of its people has been shamed by Apartheid structure is overdue.
- To provide a quantitative account of the significance of shame experience in South Africa's population, as these relate to their apartheid-given identities.
- A quantitative account of shame and its relation to 'coloured' racialised identity within current understandings of these concepts, in order to begin to better understand the lived experiences of people within this framework. This is premised on challenging accepted discourse on South Africa's history of oppression and keeping it open in order for people to work with it in dynamic ways, believing that this prevents an erasure that threatens to perpetrate that past. This is done in the belief that people's sense of their selves should never be felt to be a *perpetration against* them.
- Research has indicated that self-conscious emotions may manifest negatively in, for example, aggression and related amoral behaviour, and substance addiction – stereotypes that have been held in relation to the 'coloured'. As the act of shaming and the resultant employing of defense mechanisms plays a pivotal etiological and maintaining role in aggression and addiction, this research may assist in the future exploration of the possible relationship between shame and an experience of racialised identity as mediating aggression and addiction in South African youth.
- Critical examination of the study will provide a template for further research into shaming across gendered identity and class, as well as contributing to literature on emotional processes important to social identity and the furthering of social psychology.

STATEMENT OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

- i. To establish whether shame is a significant experience for South African students who ascribe to a racialised identity. The significance of shame experiences will be established through the application of the Internalized Shame Scale (ISS; Cook, 1987, 1996, 2001). The ISS measures the extent to which shame becomes magnified and internalised. The items of the scale represent feelings of inferiority, worthlessness, inadequacy and alienation (Cook, 2001) and respondents are asked to rate each of the 30 items on a 5-point frequency scale, ranging from 'A' ("Never") to 'E' ("Almost Always"). Twenty-four negatively worded items that measure shame are present as well as 6 items that measure self-esteem, that are positively worded. Unlike scenario-based instruments such as the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner and Gramzow, 1989, Tangney, Burggraf and Wagner, 1995), the ISS emphasises negative feeling and cognitive state by using highly descriptive words that represent the shame experience.
- ii. To determine ascription to 'racial' identity by using scales developed by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992), and Bornman (1988, in Holtman, 2002). These will be administered to identify attitudes towards own 'racial' identity. Luhtanen et al's (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale consists of 4 subscales: Membership Esteem, Public Collective Self-Esteem, Private Collective Self-Esteem, and Importance to Identity, all of which represent aspects of Social Identity Theory's (SIT; Tajfel, 1987, 1981) construction of social identity. This denotes aspects of 'race', ethnic background, religion and feelings of belonging in one's community, given that social identity is both determined by an own evaluation of one's group as well as whether this is valued by those outside of one's group. Respondents are requested to respond to the 16-items on a 5-point Likert-type scale where 'A' = strongly disagree, 'B' = disagree, 'C' = neutral, 'D' = agree, 'E' = strongly agree. The above scale has been augmented with additional items taken from Bornman (1988, in Holtman, 2002). These may be seen to cover similar aspects of membership, public and private self-esteem, and importance to identity, which is covered in the above scale. Items from both scales have been changed to ask respondents to reflect on 'racial' identity, rather than any other social group (Luhtanen, et al, 1992), or ethnic (Holtman, 1998) identity. For differentiation purposes with regard to statistical analysis the combined scale will be referred to as the Strength of Racial Identification Scale.

- iii
 - a) Based on literature that posits that shame is a significant experience for people who ascribe to a 'coloured' identity, to find out whether their shame experience is significant and
 - b) whether this differs from the experience of other 'racialised' groups.
- iv To attempt to understand this (iiia) by placing it within a psycho-socio-political framework

HYPOTHESIS

- i. That shame is a significant experience for individuals in South Africa, given the country's Apartheid history.
- ii. That the experience of shame varies significantly in accordance with apartheid-classified 'race' experiences. Situating a marginal 'coloured' 'racial' identity based on an analysis of psycho-socio-political discourse, it is hypothesized that people who ascribe to a 'coloured' identity may have higher levels of internalised shame.

SUMMARY AND RESTATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The hypothesis for research is that shame correlates with ascription to particular racialised identities and is therefore a significant experience in the lives of South African students. The hypothesis states that students who ascribe to a 'coloured' identity will have higher levels of internalised shame than students who ascribe to any other racialised identity. This will be tested by the administration of the Internalized Shame Scale and a 'racial' identity questionnaire, on a sample of university students. An attempt is made to hypothesize about the relationship between shame and racialised identity in South Africa, that situates shame both psychologically and politically and will contribute to ways of working personally and politically that reduces the negative consequences of shame for an identified group.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The study of shame in relation to 'coloured' as opposed to 'white' or 'black' identity stems from an interest in an identity that has received the dubious distinction of being seen, both historically and contemporaneously, as 'lesser'. An identification of people that are seen to have played a collaborating role in apartheid pre-1994 and a maintaining role after the first democratic elections in the country has been made (see du Pré, 1997, Prinsloo, 1997a, 1997b, Kadalie, 1995/6). Because of this, the lives of people who ascribe to a 'coloured' identity are inexorably tied to negative perceptions, which is integral to the shame experience. It is useful to investigate historical occurrences that link shame and the act of the 'coloured'. This is the focus of the following four sections of the literature review.

The first section situates the 'coloured' individual historically and currently, as a signifier of 'waste' and 'impurity' and how this has been grappled with; both by individuals who ascribe to the positive use value of a 'coloured' identity, and how it has been mobilised to negatively disrupt and denigrate 'coloured' people's lives. Situating the theory around 'colouredness' is important and I do so in the frame of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978, 1987, 1981), in the second section. It attempts to look at the function of the 'other' in social relations and how this has developed in its critical use for understanding the social aspects of shame. Next, (section three) the literature on shame is discussed, with emphasis on the distinction between shame and guilt where shame is seen as a more psychopathological construct. Special reference is made to the politics of shaming in shaping accepted knowledge and in providing a construct which is thought to be applicable to the identity - psychological and social - of the 'coloured' individual. These connections will be made throughout. Because of the exploratory nature of this work I have voiced certain conjectures and theories of my own along the way. Where this is the case, it is acknowledged and not stated as fact.

A. COLOURED IDENTITY

i. Outside: Situating the contentious 'coloured'

Provincial elections in the Western Cape, South Africa, in 1994 and similarly in 1999 saw the majority of 'coloured' people voting for the National Party and latterly, for the National Party and Democratic Party alliance. In a discussion paper presented by Prinsloo (1997) there is a persistent account of a 'coloured' social identity which accounts for the election results. It appears that little in the way of theoretical argument can wish away a 'coloured' identity and the address of such beyond rhetoric is seen as necessary to claim back power from the apartheid oppressor. Prinsloo (1997, p. 3) has stressed Weberian subjectivity of belief in a common ancestry for the existence of the group, "in contrast to objective criteria that mark a group's boundaries". Further, 'givens' of social existence such as birth and upbringing within a religious community, common language or dialect and other social practices which bind people to each other, are stressed (Geertz, C., 1963, cited in Prinsloo, 1997) in the constitution of a 'coloured' group identity.

Such phenomena have also been expressed in Jensen and Turner (1996), when they attempt to construct the othering of 'colouredness'. Acknowledgement that 'coloureds' occupied an ambivalent position for the 'white' is acceded; language, history and culture being more similar to Afrikaners, they were yet excluded as legitimate and belonged to neither 'black' nor 'white'. Jensen and Turner (1996) turn to Bauman's analysis of the stranger – an ambivalence, a "waste product of the construction of order – in this case the construction of South African nationhood" (Jensen and Turner, 1996, p. 3-4). This nationhood had to be further premised and engendered by the use of stereotyping in order to distance the ambivalent 'coloured' even further from the Afrikaner. Stereotypes of 'coloureds' had them as "weak, drunken, lecherous, of bastard origin, childish, happy-go-lucky, unfit for politics and power, irresponsible, prone to criminal behaviour and always trying to pass as whites" (Western, J., 1981 cited in Jensen and Turner, 1996, p. 5).

Trying to explicate on "Identities and Strategies among Coloureds in Heideveld, Cape Town", Jensen and Turner (1996), while conceding that identity is always constructed, have directed their focus on those people who identify a 'coloured' group and a 'coloured' selves. They identified seven coping mechanisms to deal with the stereotypes of living 'coloured' lives in Heideveld. One of these was a claim to respectability by keeping the home clean and orderly so that the chaos and disordered morality of the gang- and crime-ridden streets would remain on the outside,

thereby claiming 'white' through civility. Another mechanism centred on religion - divisive between 'coloureds' whose actions were directed at God, and those who epitomised the stereotypes and experienced misery due to lack of religious adherence, rather than as a result of institutionalised apartheid. A third strategy centred on a total rejection of 'white'-imposed racial categories, claiming 'black' or 'so-called coloured' or 'working class'. On consideration, it is clear that this strategy did not aim to work so much against 'whites' as it did against 'coloureds' themselves. Jensen and Turner (1996) point out that by constructing a positive identity through the condemnation of 'coloureds' who behaved in negative ways, 'coloured' stereotypes were kept alive, reinforcing the existence of a group they wished to deny.

A fourth strategy has its relation to the proclivity of gangsterism and negative characteristics associated; being criminal, lecherous, drunken and untrustworthy. These are, however, accepted and willingly reinforced, thereby asserting badness and thus strength. This is a contradiction of the weak, effeminate 'coloured'. At the intersection of gang phenomena as expression of economic need, identity, masculinity and territoriality, it is the claiming back of space and social networks that were uprooted through apartheid legislation such as the Group Areas Act etc., that endows gangsterism with its strength as a rejection of negative 'coloured' stereotypes (Jensen and Turner, 1996). Similarly, the strategy of ascribing personal belonging to Heideveld served to restrict movement out of the area and to keep the chaos of the other unknowns at bay. An ambiguity in the chaos that is known and the chaos that isn't - that is *othered* - is expressed, reflecting a subconscious acceptance of negative stereotypes of 'coloureds', who are fortunately living in *an other* area.

Jensen and Turner have termed 'I am Brown' as a sixth strategy that comes closest to accepting a positive 'coloured' identity - precisely as 'coloured' is not employed because of its inherent association with negative stereotypes. Different strategies such as explaining the distortions of behaviour attributed in negative stereotypes, as well as claiming 'roots' and a 'coloured' nationality based on territory (the Western Cape), a language (Afrikaans), identity and culture (brown Afrikaners) and a history, are employed. Prescription to a Muslim identity served as another strategy. Islam is seen as "one of the few cultural institutions that can counter the Western (white) hegemony" (Jensen and Turner, 1996, p. 25). A Muslim neither being of dubious descent nor being allowed to drink; the weakness and chaos of the 'coloured' stereotype is further countered.

It is fit to note that Jensen and Turner (1996) themselves are of the view that no such thing as a 'coloured' identity exists. They go on to state that "the category of Coloureds only exists in the sense that a group of people have a common experience of being labelled negatively and subsequently react to avoid these stereotypes" (Jensen and Turner, 1996, p. 28).

While Jensen and Turner's (1996) study highlights coping mechanisms to pathological structures put in the place of the 'coloured psyche', the argument for such has its retrospective counter in the research of Mann (cited in Louw and Foster, 1991). In 1957 and 1958 Jack Mann delved into the proposed marginality of 'coloured' people, which would have social-psychological consequences characterised by a "marginal personality" of "insecurity feelings, self-pity and exaggerated sensitivity" (in Louw and Foster, 1991). The thinking betrayed the perceived space between a privileged 'white' group and a less privileged 'black' group and characterised it as marginal. Mann (1958), however, concluded that in relation to 'whites' on measures of marginal personality, orientation to 'whites' and social distance; that there were virtually no differences between the groups, and that 'coloured' people did not have a propensity towards this particular "psychological upset" (Mann, 1958, p. 87, as cited in Louw and Foster, 1991).

We can see how a specifically South African historical analysis particularises shame as an essential element for racialised identity to function and how social psychological understandings have helped to maintain 'othering', marginal discourse around a 'coloured' people.

ii. Historical strategies to situate 'coloured' identity

Gavin Lewis (1987) provides an erudite account of major 'coloured' political involvement in the Western Cape from 1902-1985. He has shown how 'coloured' political parties such as the African People's Organisation (APO) stressed a "coloured identity apart from Africans, especially given the greater disabilities attached to being African. This formed part of the desire to uplift all Coloured to 'respectability' and a 'civilised' status, with the ultimate goal of acceptance into the white dominated society" (Lewis, 1987, p. 109).

By and large this manifested as concessions made to 'coloureds' by an apartheid government, such as the forwarding in 1926 of the Coloured Persons' Rights Bill, which further extended 'coloured' voting rights to eligible persons in each province to control dissent after the removal of Africans (read 'blacks') from the voters role in the Cape. Similarly, the founding of the African

National Bond in 1925, in essence a pro-National Party organisation, served as a 'coloured wing' of that party and vied for recognition of 'coloured' people as a distinct 'race'. Thus, while opposing discrimination as 'coloured', Lewis (1987, p. 128) notes that they also sought "protection from competition with the 'Native'". This analysis is supported later by Prinsloo (1997) who sees access to scarce resources, physical and psychological threat perception, intergroup relations, socialisation in 'coloured' group areas, public discourse and traditional group 'markers' as factors in the formation of 'coloured' identity and community awareness.

Lewis (1987) does, however, also question whether a belief in this 'coloured' identity existed, for after failure to pass the CPR Bill in 1935 and the New Deal disintegrated, it was apparent how the mobilisation of 'coloured' identity depended on material gain, and that little was cognitively and emotionally invested in a separate, 'coloured' 'racial' identity. In fact, the Wilcocks Commission Inquiry into the socio-economic conditions of 'coloureds' in 1934 showed that 'coloured' identity carried real material benefit compared to those of 'African identity' and commented on the number of 'coloureds' 'passing' for 'white'. The South African Institute of Race Relations underscored this point, noting that individual standing of 'coloureds' in their communities was affected by skin colour and that close proximity to 'whiteness' brought higher status. Lewis (1987, p. 219) has noted that "genuine concern for the alleviation of coloured unemployment led them sometimes to suggest measures that effectively reinforced discrimination", referring to the Coloured Advisory Council of 1943 calling for restrictions on African influx to protect 'coloured' labour in the Western Cape as a due for 'coloured' wartime loyalty.

Still, major 'coloured' political parties such as the Anti-CAD (CAD: Coloured Affairs Department), the African National Bond and the Coloured Peoples National Union could never convincingly organise over the issue of 'coloured' identity. With little recognition of their own African culture, history or tradition, there was no call to 'race' pride in that sense. Instead, calling to pride meant abandoning feelings of inferiority vis-a-vis 'white' people (Lewis, 1987). Some 'coloured' political agendas meant this as unification as 'coloured' and the demand for integration into 'white' society (APO, Anti-CAD), while for other organisations the essential point of mobilisation centred around acceptance of 'white'-imposed 'coloured' identity and the distancing of 'coloureds' from Africans. This second agenda served as reassurance to 'whites' that equal rights for 'coloureds' would not mean assimilation into the 'white' community (Lewis, 1987). Thus, it was never explicated, this 'coloured' identity – neither cultural, 'racial', nor ethnic qualities were claimed and the complexity has yet to be addressed.

iii. Rewards, recriminations and rhetoric around the 'coloured'

After South Africa's first democratic elections the political project of "Coloured Consciousness; Building or Dividing the Nation?" (Kadali, 1996) considers identity as a tool where viewing oneself as 'coloured', 'white', Indian etc. would achieve different aims than the renunciation of these to a primarily (and foremost) South African identity – these ascriptions each serving the interests of different "forces" (p.18). Post 1994 it was argued that even after 'coloured' people had been 'afforded' the right to claim their own positive identities and direct their own course of political and social in/action, the entire apartheid-classified group was charged with threatening democracy because the Western Cape was the only province not to produce an ANC parliamentary majority (Wicomb, 1998; see also Prinsloo, 1997, du Pré, 1997).

Du Pré, in consideration of this, explains that the disintegration of the 'coloured' population group (into the 'Coloured' English, the 'Coloured' African, Griquas, San, and 'Coloured' Afrikaners) has resulted in their insecurity and withdrawal from a national project of reconciliation. Arguing for "brown Afrikaners" to be reconciled with their 'white' counterparts so that their "hybridity" (p. 96) would not exclude them from the national project, du Pré notes that these two groups share considerable Christian heritage - that of the same church denominations, and that of the Christian heritage of racism, with little argument for this other than the 'proof' that the 'coloured' vote of 1994 was racially motivated. (We note that three years after the country's first democratic elections the language of 'race' with its two-fold purpose of fostering both oppression and the overthrow of that oppression (Wicomb, 1991) had rooted itself in the former evocation once again). du Pré suggests that the only reason for the continued, mistaken, ascription to a 'coloured' identity is due to the application of the Group Areas Act and the residential boundedness of people, a sentiment echoed in Jensen and Turner (1996).

We note how psychopathological rhetoric is employed post-1994. Du Pre (1997, p. 82) views the 'coloured' "crisis of identity" as a result of the abolishment of racial classification in 1991 and Prinsloo (1997) cites Erasmus and Pieterse (1997) in their delineation of scholarly and political interpretations of the role, as arguing the point, amongst others, that 'coloureds' "suffer from slave mentality and are 'psychologically damaged'" (Prinsloo, 1997, p. 21). Additionally, Simone (1994, p.166) has brought into sharp relief the invisibility of the existence of the 'coloured', noting that as products of miscegenation under an apartheid government, 'coloureds' were seen as

an “unfortunate accident, a transgression against the will of God” and while “Africans may have been born as savages, yet coloureds essentially should never have been born at all”.

The post-colonial resurgence of the term ‘coloured’ is indeed different from its use in the apartheid era where ‘so-called’ does not prefix it and it is no longer encapsulated by quotation marks, nor replaced by the term ‘black’ which, as Zoë Wicomb (1998, p. 93) points out, indicated both a “rejection of apartheid nomenclature as well as inclusion in the national liberation movement”. But why, one would ask, would inclusion in these struggles only be obtainable through ‘black’, not ‘coloured’, if it was recognised that both apartheid-classified groups were constructed to be oppressed, and struggled against this. Not accounting for what is more shaming about ‘colouredness’ than ‘blackness’, we can at least see that Wicomb also regards an implicit shameful of ‘colouredness’ over ‘blackness’. Furthermore, discourse on postcoloniality and postmodernism seem to indicate diverging projects which fail to reconcile forms of identity that are disruptive and yet complicitous with its imposition. These disruptions in and negations of ‘coloured’ identity are indicative, however, of a larger underlying debate that is offset by the constructionism of identity, in the project of ‘reframing’ (for example, Prinsloo, 1997) and ‘remaking’ (see for example Simone, 1994) of ‘coloured’ identity. However politically useful this proves, the implications of reconstructing/reconstituting rhetoric may be argued to serve divergent purposes; that of empowerment in laying claim to a ‘coloured’ identity on one’s own terms or that of reifying the notion of the essentially fragmented, divisive, inadequate and therefore shameful ‘coloured’ self.

iv. Inside: Situating the ‘coloured’ self

Erasmus (2001) makes the point that to view ‘coloured’ identity as constituted in the beginnings of apartheid and ‘racial’ oppression would be distorting the role of the ‘coloured’ in the making of herself – that it is not only an apartheid label imposed by ‘whites’ but that it is distinguished by borrowing and creation, i.e. “cultural creativity” under specific situations of marginalisation (Erasmus, 2001, p. 16). Erasmus notes the familiar stereotypes that have been raised earlier in this discussion, but also points to the ideological practicalities of not fitting in to a dominant categorisation of people; and uses the example of the Black Consciousness Movement of the 1970’s that endorsed a narrow definition of ‘blackness’ that could somehow not fit into the “differential racialisation” of what it meant to live in South Africa; i.e. not only as much concerned with ‘black’ and ‘white’, but with different layers of “racial hierarchies” (2001, p. 19).

Reflecting on the fact that South Africa is still engaging with 'colouredness' and that it hasn't been subsumed under 'black' or 'white', may be seen to bear testimony to a people who will not be ignored or forgotten and who, indeed, have a strong identity. Erasmus (2001) makes a similar point; that rainbow nationalist discourse ignores the social and psychological particularities in the act of constituting difference.

Cheryl Hendricks goes on to consider (what one might call) the 'use value' of the 'coloured' body and how it came to be constituted through sexual liaisons between the 'white' colonist (Dutch and British settlers) and the indigenous people of southern Africa; slaves brought over from Madagascar, Mozambique, Angola, the Indonesian Archipelago, Bengal, South India and Sri Lanka. Hendricks (2001, p. 35) says that those of 'mixed' descent born in the Cape... "were therefore representative of the encounter between Europe and Africa. The visibility of the body-politic would carry the shame which Europeans bestowed on their relationships". Hendricks relates the view of that time; the 'coloured' body as an advantage in its "approximation to whiteness, yet despised for its association with 'bastardization/hybridity' in a world that came to privilege 'authenticity/purity'". This shame, with varied and shifting dimensions, is one which has undergirded the social fabric of coloured identity and accounts for the ambivalence associated with it" (Hendricks, p. 35). This was further problematised amongst these people by the different value attached to their desirability prescribed through lineage; of either being from east Asian descent, from other parts of Africa, or Creoles without European descent (see Gqola, 2001 for the problematic further engendered by these categories). Hendricks (2001) makes the contentious point that this impurity by blood of the 'coloured', (that allowed for the projection of all 'impure' acts and desires onto them) accounted for what many authors have noted as the concern with acting civilised, in order to prove worthiness. Thus, in being not quite 'black' and not quite 'white'; a 'buffered identity' which was necessary to distance them from 'black' Africans and to be the demarcation between the superior 'white' and 'other' identities. In this regard, Reddy (2001, p. 77) notes that "when state praxis has the effect of making an area of personal identity open to public debate and personal contestation, personal identity becomes politicized".

Connecting 'coloured' identity and emotion, Sean Field (2001), in his interviews with geographically displaced members of a 'coloured' community, discovers that there is difficulty finding words to voice the feelings attendant to the oppression people have suffered as a result of forced removals. Through that loss there is a part-mythical narrative serving the purpose of retaining a sense of self and identity that has been attacked. Following Erikson's (1966/1976, p.

60) thoughts on identity in that it is “a subjective *sense of invigorating sameness and continuity*” (emphasis in original) (cited in Helms, 1996), Reddy contends that growing up and maturing is consequently unsettled and dislocated, making it difficult to establish a positive sense of self and identity that can be sustained. The psychological consequences are also spoken of when Reddy (2001, p. 106) reveals that in ‘coloured’ people’s relation to both ‘white’ and ‘black’ people, there is an “ambiguous mixture of fear and desire”. (The question arises of the link between this ambiguity of fear and desire and whether its offshoot is in shame, a description of that, which is explored hereunder). This is also suggested to affect evaluation of self-worth and thus confident decision-making and procrastination. Procrastination, in the act of delaying completion and evaluation, has been shown (by Fee and Tangney, 2001), to be a means of avoiding shame and humiliation (this self-handicapping as a self-protective mechanism against other-evaluation, termed ‘impression management’). Momentary experiences of other-evaluation gives rise to a pattern of procrastination in the attempt to avoid shame, humiliation, or fear of negative evaluation, and serves as a powerful indictment of any reductionist attempt to understand the ‘immobility’ of a ‘coloured’ ‘colonial’ mindset.

The volume in which these papers appear, **Coloured by History, Shaped by Place** (Erasmus, 2001), is by no means an articulation of a new theorising around the meaning and experience of ‘coloured’ identity; and much problem-solving, in terms of how it can be applied to the self- and other-evaluation experience of shame has to be extrapolated through a reading of history and psychological developmental theory. The work, however, does provide an empowered understanding of ‘coloured’ people about themselves, but still remains strongly a work that shies away from the question of whether shame is a relevant, i.e., a significant, experience in the lives of ordinary ‘coloured’ individuals who are not also participating in the rarified world of academic interest. This forms part of a critique of the Erasmus (2001) work; that there is a concern that ‘race’ is reified – that there is no sense of an evolution to nonracialism, rather than the more problematic antiracism (see Rattansi, 1995). Mitchell (2002 in Rappetti, 2002) makes the useful point that Nelson Mandela’s reconciliation (read nonracial nationalism) was way ahead of its time, and that people who identified as ‘coloured’ needed to deal with this history first. This, we can see, is supported in subsequent attempts to deal with other problematic identities (see Steyn, 2002, cited in mondaypaper, 2002, in her address of ‘whiteness’). Not doing so would be akin to a foreclosure of identity.

B. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY: A MODEL FOR THEORISING

In a discussion on notions of difference - especially with regard to a racialised identity - as constituting shame, it is important to understand the relationship between the 'social' construct and the 'personal, psychological' construct. With the use of a particular framework we can create links and address the idea of difference. Social Identity Theory (SIT, Tajfel, 1987, 1981, as cited in de la Rey, 1991) has been put forward as a framework for the understanding of intergroup processes which includes a critical inclusion of society's class structure and other artefacts, such as language and the ideas and beliefs of a particular society. Important to the theory, especially so for the purposes of this research, is the idea that intergroup behaviour is not defined by the number of people involved in the interaction but rather whether the content of interaction is regulated by personal or group identification and the meanings and consequences thereof.

Through social categorisation we are able to place ourselves in society and this becomes internalised as part of our self-concept. Thus, two constellations; personal identity and social identity can be subsumed under this (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, cited in de la Rey, 1991). SIT further assumes that social identities are of an evaluative nature, emphasising gradation of differences and a status hierarchy. So, depending on whether one's membership to a particular status group is positive or negative, one will experience a positive or negative social identity (de la Rey, 1991). Jensen and Turner (1996), for example, then inadvertently describe the psychological and social mobility strategies (explicated in SIT) of 'coloured' people where there is a presence or absence of cognitive alternatives to the hierarchical nature of group and social identification. Thus we see that the process is an active one where both individuals and groups may be transformed.

i. SIT, prejudice and cognition

SIT has been critiqued, and in Michael Billig's review of Tajfel's 'Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice' (1969a, cited in Billig, 2002), a forerunner to theorising SIT, he considers the dilemmas that are thrown up when considering prejudice in this light, which may have relevance for the current study. Thinking about the Holocaust and the matrix for understanding this history through the idea that Nazi German persecution of Jews arose out of processes of searching to understand the world and to protect their self-integrity, Billig (2002) notes that there is nothing intrinsic in such processes. (In doing so he eschews - as Tajfel did - the 'blood-and-guts'

approach that employs the psychoanalytic idea of a 'death drive' that makes genocide inevitable). This search for understanding and integrity is premised as a motivational aspect of prejudice and bigotry, though in itself does not *explain* it (this would be reductionism). Yet this understanding and search is an intellectual one. Even in more recent research there has been this echo. Cameron and Lalonde (2000), for instance, postulate that it is a stronger cognitive component in the development of identity that involves accessing knowledge that pertains to a group's cultural, social and political history. (They have found this, for example, in examining perceptions related to gendered identity). Neither was there, for Tajfel, a discussion of motivational aspects in terms of an "emotional investment" much beyond a recognition that this must indeed be the case and that this emotion was socially constructed (Billig, 2002, p. 179).

In the theory of social identity the concept of depersonalisation was introduced in the orthodox implication of the eventual dehumanising aspects of prejudice and bigotry (Tajfel, 1981, cited in Billig, 2002). This transformed with Self-Categorisation Theory to an understanding of depersonalisation of the *self* and fellow *in-group members*. (Hogg, 1996 cited in Billig, 2002). This involved a shift towards viewing the positive aspects of gaining a culturally constructed in-group identity, and needs to be distinguished from concepts of 'dehumanisation' and 'deindividuation' (Turner et al, 1987, cited in Billig, 2002). Where depersonalisation is positive and valued the theory is applicable. The immediate question related to the current study, however, would be whether this implies that in the process of depersonalisation, boundaries become more diffuse and whether the 'gains' are also ascription, assumption, stereotype, and whether individuals are then liable to greater/more instances of prejudgement – either positive or negative? This is not the concern of the paper (Billig, 2002) and is not addressed subsequently by comments to it (see Frosh and Brown, 2002). However, what theorising in this way does, is provide an alternative *reading* with no telling of a way to achieve a valued depersonalisation. A historical analysis shows that this is not the tendency of the social. We are still left to deal with the *illegitimate* ascription, assumption, and stereotype.

ii. SIT, prejudice and emotion

In understanding and not explaining we are left to observe outcomes with a relatively poorer sense of what the inputs are that result in this output - to use the 'machine' as the unit of analysis that incorporates the psychological, material and social aspects of identity (as put forward by Deleuze and Guattari 1983, cited in Brown and Lunt, 2002). While effort has been made to address

the causative nature of emotional investment for prejudice and bigotry, what is the 'extra dimension' of emotion that flows from prejudice and bigotry? Social psychology has not dealt with that 'extra dimension' viz. emotional investment. Billig (2002, p. 177) argues that there is nothing intrinsic about "the universal processes of categorization, assimilation and coherence that would account for the historical specificity of Nazi ideology". One would be tempted to extend this to the focus of this thesis; is there similarly nothing intrinsic about shaming to processes of categorisation, assimilation and coherence, that stems from prejudice and bigotry? Is not this the emotional output?

iii. SIT and self-consciousness

Abrams and Brown (1989) look at the way in which behaviour is managed in intergroup contexts where social identity is salient. They conclude that self-focussed attention is an important aspect in the regulation of group behaviour when social identity is salient. Their study takes into account literature positing that one of the consequences of becoming involved in a group context is loss of self-consciousness, manifesting in anonymity, lack of identifiability and externally focussed attention that leads to deindividuation (Diener, 1980, in Abrams et al, 1989). Deindividuation (dissimilar from Hogg's (1996) concept of depersonalisation) is seen in the loss of inhibition, counternormative behaviour, and a sense of unity with the group; namely a loss of *sense of self*. Abrams himself (1988) has also suggested that it is possible that self-awareness may operate independently from identity salience and vice versa.

However, in considering a relationship between self-awareness and identity salience, Abrams et al (1989, p. 312) later suggest that "when social identity is salient, private self-focus (on identity) will increase rather than decrease the impact of group membership on behaviour". In a review of the relevant literature Abrams et al (1989, p. 311) note that self-awareness theorists propose that an individual "matches" her behaviour "to a relevant standard and is more responsive to affective states" when her attention is self-directed. This could be seen as an early attempt at a move towards explicating the emotional component in SIT. This allowed Abrams et al (1989) to distinguish between people who had higher private self-consciousness and who "behaved more in terms of their social identity, displayed in-group loyalty and preserved in-group distinctiveness"; compared with people with higher public self-consciousness who "tended to behave in a more socially desirable way" (Abrams et al, 1989, p. 311). It appears that Abrams and Brown (1989) use *self-awareness* and *self-consciousness* in an interchangeable way. While it may be the case

that shame is one of this gamut of emotions that this self-consciousness involves, they are never explicit about these specific affective states.

iv. Shifting social identification

It is, however, stressed again that clear distinctions between the cognitive and emotional components of SIT and its saliency in group processes in different social contexts should be resisted. In research by Doosje, Spears and Ellemers (2002) there is the desire to steer away from identity and identification as mere epiphenomena; with clear cause and effect. This tendency could be seen in the above, all-encompassing concepts of self-awareness, and social identity as derived from the “status structure” in Abrams and Brown’s (1989) study. Doosje et al (2002, p. 58) show that identification is affected temporally in a study that looks at “in-group identification in low-status groups as a function of both expected and actual changes in the intergroup status hierarchy”. It is shown that level of group identification may be held as independent variable as well as a dependent variable at different points in time. Within the framework of SIT this looks at differences in the impact of “anticipated and actual alterations in the intergroup structure”, and how this is also affected by *initial* levels of low or high identification with the in-group.

Initial low identifiers express higher in-group identification when the social context is unstable and improvement to group status is likely. Initial high identifiers maintain their identification even if their group is faced with an uncertain future. It is shown that low status does not necessarily negatively affect identification. However, identification may be negatively affected for initial low identification individuals in a prolonged unstable context where improvement to group status is uncertain. *Initial* levels of group identification are shown as important variables in predicting responses to different kinds of change in the social context (Doosje et al, 2002). In respect of future recommendations based on the current study it might be significant to establish levels of shame in relation to *temporal* ‘racial’ identification in a two-test study which allows for analysis of the presenting social and political climate and estimation of favourable change for the in-group. Group identification (a measure of commitment to a group) is considered to be closely linked with group homogeneity; considered a psychological indication of the “tendency to construe the situation, and *the self*, in group terms” (own emphasis) (Doosje, 2002, p. 67), and is an important variable in this research. The fact that low identifiers compared to high identifiers are more instrumental under conditions of instability (Ellemers, 2001) suggests another reason for

a temporal study when we consider the disputed nature and thus saliency of 'coloured' identity and the interaction with shame as an internal structure.

University of Cape Town

C. SHAME

i. Towards a Definition

How, then, do we begin to understand the phenomenon of shame and its relation to the racialised identity of 'coloured' people?

"Shame is about the self. The word... refers to, not simply to one type of affect, but to a complex emotional system regulating the social bond, that is, signalling disturbance to the status of the self within the social order: what one is before oneself and others; one's standing, importance, or lack of it; one's lovability, sense of acceptability, or imminent rejection, as seen before the eye of the other or the internal self-evaluative eye of the self".

(Lansky, 1999, p. 347).

With this description, Lansky (1999) elucidates the complex awakening that is the experience of shame. An experience of awareness of the self in relation to oneself and in relation to an other which, in the postulated positioning of the 'coloured' individual – as imminently in danger of rejection – places her at the risk of shame.

Rybak and Brown (1996), quote Havel (1991), as aptly capturing shame in "(A) profound, banal, and therefore vague sensation of culpability, as though my very existence were a kind of sin. Then there is a powerful feeling of general alienation, both of my own and relating to everything around me, that helps to create such feelings; and experience of *unbearable oppressiveness, a need constantly to explain myself to someone, to defend myself, a longing for an unthinkable order of things,...*" (own emphasis) (p. 77, in Rybak et al, 1996, p. 72).

Shame has been characterised as an acute momentary loss of self-esteem (Modigliani, 1971, in Tangney, 1995) in the exposure to, and a great concern with others' opinion of one's person. June Price Tangney (1996, 1995, 1994, 1992) has written extensively on an affective experience that is characterised by extreme self-consciousness - feelings of being physically smaller, inferior to others and powerless. Shame is experienced as a sweeping, negative affective response, disproportionate to the nature of the eliciting situation (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher and Gramzow, 1992). Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera and Mascolo (1995) have emphasized also that it is

therapeutically useful to differentiate shame from feelings of inferiority as this distinction appears to be important to clients (Lindsay-Hartz, 1987, 1992, 1995 cited in Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, Mascolo, 1995). The notion of a deviation from social standards and a judgmental audience is salient (Stipek, 1995).

ii. Defending Against Shame

Potter-Efron (1987) upholds the theory that the defensive response to the overwhelming by shame is withdrawal, seen in the largely physiological reaction that makes shame so visible (e.g. averting the gaze, emotional disengagement and seeking anonymity). Denial is considered a second defense mechanism. In the marginalised position of representing a 'coloured' identity, this may be seen in the refusal to engage with the possibility of the usefulness of such an ascription for people who identify themselves as 'coloured'. "(H)abitually" angry and aggressive individuals may preempt feelings of shame where they perceive an attempt is being made to shame them. Perfectionism may also be used to offset internal feelings of inadequacy. Potter-Efron (1987) lists Broucek's (1982) conception of grandiosity as a reaction formation so that the individual's perceived state of invisibility is defended against by becoming more visible and demanding more power. Another reaction formation would include shamelessness, which is countenanced in exhibitionistic behaviour – thus, being "beyond shame" (Potter-Efron, 1987, p.13).

By Lansky's (1999) account of it, it is not only the conscious aspect of shame that provides an account of experience; but also can be inferred from feelings/situations that inspire envy, vengefulness and hostility, to name but a few. Defensive behaviour in the moment of shame that includes withdrawal and averted gaze is an attempt to stifle the experience. This is towards the purpose of regulating status within social interrelations. Kilbourne (1999) believes that much fantasy is fueled by shame, specifically that of invisibility. Invisibility is sought by the one shamed in order to avoid conflict/pain of being seen as one does not want to be seen – desiring not to be seen; yet then the exacerbation of anxiety over being neglected. For the shamed this experience of being perpetually misunderstood (Kilbourne, 1999).

Shame threatens the self as it is either debilitating or creates the defense where grandiosity is allowed to take hold, rather than experience the omnipotent, omnipresent, inadequate self. Both these engagements with shame in the individual with a shame-based outlook may occur and the ever-increasing push to deal with this outlook, recode, reidentify, reassimilate according to the

cognitive, feeling structure may be considered a “disconfirmation of self” (Kilbourne, 1999, p. 72). Tomkins’ (1962) affect theory is used to argue that if shame acts to inhibit interest or enjoyment, then a sufficient intensity of shame will lead to an observable reduction in interest and enjoyment in life. Without the positive motivation of these affects to enjoy life, with the dominant affect being negative; withdrawal from daily life activities is sure to follow, with resultant depression.

iii. Differentiating between Shame and Guilt

While shame and guilt have been linked as self-conscious emotions (Tangney et al, 1995), it has become important when addressing the cause and effects of shame to differentiate between the two. Both are internal affective states that are difficult to assess directly (though there has been extensive research into the recognition of emotions through facial expression). While separations have in the past been understood to be around the ‘private’ nature of guilt and the ‘public’ nature of shame, it is now rather generally accepted that both shame and guilt may be experienced in similar situations. In fact, it is often an individual person’s inability to distinguish between these emotions for themselves that has made the construction of assessment instruments in this regard so difficult (Tangney, 1996). Neither are there specific shame- or guilt-eliciting situations; rather it is the manner in which events are perceived that differentiates between shame and guilt (see Niedenthal, Tangney and Gavanski, 1994). It is now considered that while shame concentrates on the self, guilt is centered on a deed or omission for which repayment is due. The idea of punishment or forgiveness that can be effected to ‘make up’ for the action that in some way ‘harmed’ another person, is the central tenet of guilt, while shame produces the desire to withdraw rather than effect any action on something over which one perceives oneself to not have any control (eg. growing old, coming from a poor family, etc.). It is the distinction of guilt’s concern with reparative action that has led to the investigation of differential influences in psychopathological outcomes between the emotions.

In this sense, guilt has been linked to a sense of responsibility (Taylor, 1996) and, rightly or wrongly as evidence suggests, to guilt being an affect of a more ‘moral’ nature than shame, positively correlated to other-oriented empathy (see Lutwak, Ferrari and Cheek, 1998, Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher and Gramzow, 1992). While such evidence exists there is also the naming of shame as responsible for the ‘maladaptive’ guilt that has surfaced as an area of interest. In measures sensitive to the self versus behaviour distinction it was found that proneness to ‘shame-

free' guilt was unrelated to psychological symptoms and positively correlated with adaptive interpersonal empathy, constructive anger management techniques and "benevolent interpersonal perceptions" (Tangney, 1996, p. 750). Tangney (1996) believes that this reflects the association of guilt with a sense of remorse or regret about a specific behaviour, which protects the self from the global devaluation associated with shame. In a damning statement against shame Tangney (1996, p. 750) says of guilt;

"...because of this focus on a specific behavior, the path towards constructive change, reparation and resolution is much clearer. As any clinician knows, it is much easier to change a bad behaviour than to change a bad, defective self",

and associates maladaptive guilt (characterised by self-castigation and obsessive rumination over some objectionable behaviour) as arising from guilt fusing with shame. Thus, a shame overlay to guilt is held accountable for psychological symptoms and reinforces the idea of the vulnerable 'coloured' psyche should it be shown that shame is a significant experience for this group.

iv. Cognitive Features of Emotional Attribution

The above is reminiscent of the transformation that occurs in counterfactual thinking. Niedenthal, Tangney and Gavanski (1994) manage to link the cognitive with the emotional aspects of shame, showing that not only does counterfactual thinking influence the causal attribution made for an outcome, but that this also influences the emotional reaction. They show that guilt and shame involve two different kinds of counterfactual thinking and amplify these two different emotions. So, whether, when engaging in counterfactual thinking, one believed that a change was necessary in the *self* to undo an outcome (shame), as opposed to undoing an *act* (guilt), would influence the proneness to either emotion (Niedenthal et al, 1994). This was true even when university students were presented with scenarios and *directed* to think in particular ways that had subjects undoing aspects of the self, or had them undoing specific behaviour. In the former scenario subjects were more likely to respond with shame feelings and in the latter case, with guilt (Niedenthal, 1994). Demos (1996, p.75) reinforces the point that "shame is about the whole self, while guilt is more closely tied to specific acts" and "the pain experienced, in each case, derives from different unconscious sources". The judgement experience of scorn, derision, contempt and ridicule present in shaming leads us to the unconscious threat of abandonment.

Relating to anger emotions, Tangney (1995) supports this idea that shame-proneness is associated with maladaptive and unconstructive responses, while guilt-prone individuals are more likely to engage in constructive ways, which enhance interpersonal relationships. So while guilt is a product of internalised values regulating behaviour, shame has an external reference where the emotion is induced by one's exposure to others and their unfavourable scrutiny – both real and imagined.

Relatedly, when assessing the interaction of shame and guilt we are able to see how the two maintain a destructive pattern of behaviour (see, for example, Potter-Efron, 1987), in the nature of their defensiveness. In the particular South African context one wonders at the possible unacknowledged shame for the 'coloured' and the speculated guilt of the 'white' that does not allow for a break in the cycle that maintains a shameful position.

D. THE POLITICS OF SHAME

i. Gendered Constructions

Approaching the subject of shame from a feminist perspective provides a re-reading of text that, from a psychoanalytic view, provides restrictive and disempowering interpretation. It is also necessary as research suggests that women report greater shame than men (Lutwak, Ferrari and Cheek, 1998). Indeed, this has led to the investigation of shame for women and men – experimentally (Lutwak et al, 1998) and for women alone, experientially (Lehtinen, 1998, Seu, 1998). While shame requires one to remake the self, it is considered maladaptive and destructive. It may also be an obstacle to identity development when one has to prescriptively re-invent, re-conceptualise, re-make the self. Lutwak et al (1998) further show that shame is positively correlated with social identity while guilt correlates positively with personal identity. Different information processing styles are also present, with more shame-prone individuals using diffuse processing styles and guilt-proneness related to an information-oriented processing style. The challenges for a feminist psychology are clear: women are being found to be more prone to shame, have strong social identities and make use of diffuse/avoidant identity processing styles which reflect a “global, less committed and non-exploratory self-identity” (Lutwak, et al, 1998, p. 1 029). This is associated with maladaptive coping styles, personal distress, social anxiety and avoidance/distancing as coping mechanisms.

Feminist writing, however, is able to provide an alternative interpretation of these findings through re-readings of shame narratives. Irene Bruna Seu (1998) conducted interviews with women regarding their subjective positions of shame. She notes these women’s use of “avoidance, withdrawal and silence as their preferred way of dealing with shame” (Seu, 1998, p. 137). Seu (1998) looked at how shameful accounts were constructed and negotiated using speech, thereby exploring meaning induced by personal and cultural points of reference. Discursive relations between subject positions and power relations could be explored. Thus we see that intrapsychic processes are influenced by social politics. Seu (1998) points out that shame material often involves situations in which there was a conflict about power. A re-reading of these narratives allowed the fore fronting of the employment of shame to denigrate personal success in a situation of power relations, rather than indicating personal failure and low self-esteem. In keeping with traditional conditions for the experience of shame, Seu (1998) points out that a subject’s experience of success was mediated by the judgement of another, i.e. the notion of a

judgmental audience. Employing shame in the experience of one's success (rather than in the perception of one's failure and low self-esteem), may be seen as an interpersonal/social management strategy, diminishing perceived challenge to another (third) party. Seu (1998) cites Anthony (1981) as positing that yet-emerging identity accounts for women's employment of shame, inferiority and self-denial where their identity has been socially, culturally and politically submerged in the service of the male identity.

ii. Shame, Developmental Theory and Addiction

In this thesis both the language of affect theory in describing the effects of shame in 'low self-esteem', and as arising in 'anxious or insecure attachment' as described in attachment theory, is used. Affect theory has informed the development of the shame measure used here, and provides important insight into the development of shame.

It is useful to consider why Cook (1987), the author of the shame measure used here, found it pertinent to apply the concept of internalised shame to addictive behaviour. His postulations that

- i. shame is internalized because of experiences of abuse/rejection in one's family of origin (FO) where this is evoked frequently,
- ii. it is associated with significant losses related to FO,
- iii. addictive behaviours arise as a result of a defensive coping strategy to deal with the painful nature of shame, and that
- iv. there is a reciprocal relationship between addictive behaviour and the experience of shame,

are important in the context of research (Cook, 1987) that shows that being self-aware and – conscious comes in the first 18-24 months, with the attendant potential to experience shame. Kaufman (1980, cited in Potter-Efron 1987) holds that the origin of shame is interpersonal and parents generate shame-inducing responses, whether overtly or covertly. Later on, in line with developing research, Cook (1991) cites studies with a 2-3 month old baby where a 'still face' is presented to the child in response to its interaction. The termination of contact by the child through turning away is conceived of as arising from a painful state of reduced interest. Repeated experiences of this without adequate reparation creates a sense of self that is unworthy or inferior and is based on the internalisation of shame experiences.

Connecting shame and attachment theory, it was found that 'avoidant' and 'ambivalent' children had the lowest levels of self-esteem - in the language of affect theory (Cassidy, 1988, cited in Cook, 1991). Shame is associated with the breaking of the bond of social connectedness, the repetition without reparation of which leads to the "inner organization of attitudes, feelings, expectations, and meanings" that is shame-based (Sroufe, 1989, cited in Cook, 1991). In the shame-based individual there is the feeling of being unacceptable to the world; that the ideal self developed in relation to the parent is not one that has been validated and which has found approval, but has been condemned as flawed, demanding better than the defective self that has been created, 'falling short'... The shame-based individual becomes expectant of abandonment – the "death by emotional starvation" (Piers, n.d., cited in Potter-Efron, 1987, p. 11, also see Cook, 1991). In this we may begin to uncover the psychodynamic sequelae arising from the brutality of loss for 'coloured' people that was entrenched in a paternally-based system of social, economic and political oppression.

Studies (Zucker and Gomberg, 1986, and Zucker, 1986) suggest that parenting that contributes to insecure attachment and high internalised shame is a predisposing factor for alcoholism later on in life. In considering the stereotype of the 'coloured' 'drunk', in the context of the 'dop' system that has been informed by socioeconomic oppression, we begin to unravel the intersection of political and the resultant psychological factors that contribute to a sense of shame. This is partly where the concern with the effect of shame in a younger generation impacted by the apartheid system comes from. Cook (1991) makes the point that it is by and large the nature of the interaction between the child and the primary care-giver, the absence of prolonged separation, no additional births, and the absence of conflict between the parents in the child's first two years of life, that creates the environment for a resilient child in the face of addiction, even where there is parental alcoholism. This arguably situates the introduction of shame as the primary risk factor for later addiction. Thus, in relation to shame and 'coloured' identity, I would suggest that though drunkenness defies 'racial' categorisation, it is the attachment of shame in oppressive relationships (such as the 'dop' system), that creates the idea of the psychopathological 'coloured' psyche (the alcoholic self), and which then ultimately challenges it, disrupts it. This understanding of the creation of the drunken, 'coloured' self is but one example of how shame is informed by negative other-evaluation in relation to 'racial' othering.

iii. Situating Shame in Social Identity through Analytic Theory

In the previous discussion about social identity theory there appeared to be a consistent account of the cognitive and emotional separation of aspects of social identity. Vogler (2000) has made an effort to attend to this in a discussion that looks at contributions of both psychoanalytic theory and social identity to explain emotional states that occur within and between groups. She uses the concept of emotional intersubjectivity (Craib, 1998a, cited in Vogler, 2000) that emphasises emotion, rather than cognition, as mediating intersubjectivity with others and which is an important part of identity. This is based on the work of Klein and Winnicott (in Craib, 1998a, cited in Vogel, 2000), which sees identity as rooted in unconscious object relations, phantasies and defense mechanisms out of which arise the processes of splitting, projection and projective identification. In psychoanalytic understanding these serve as an unconscious form of communication of anxieties. The infant's engagement in projective identification allows its feelings to be put inside the caretaker so that they can be taken care of. However, in dealing with a frustrating world (caretaker) the infant copes by splitting the world into the 'good' and the 'bad', introjecting the former and projecting the latter onto an external object (Klein's paranoid-schizoid position). Later, increased tolerance of frustration that comes with ego strength allows the awareness that both love and hate may be directed at the same object without destroying it (Klein's depressive position).

The Winnicottian idea of a transitional area (where internal phantasy meets outside reality) that is constituted in the above process, is seen by Craib (1998a, cited in Vogel, 2000) as the point at which personal identity first comes to the fore and where "internal object relations may also come to be superimposed on current relationships so that the external world is taken over by the internal world and we respond to others emotionally as if they were disliked parts of our own selves..." (Vogel, 2000, p. 21). Projective identification – when our behaviours lead the other to experience a (initially, our own) feared quality in themselves may be seen in group processes as well, in a united response against out-groups. However, this unanimous expression of will is experienced as stifling and acts as a censure against anything the group does not want to acknowledge. This anxiety is defended against in the use of basic assumptions that provide meaning for group behaviour in one of three common purposes; fight/flight, pairing or dependency. If individuals in a group work with one common purpose and lose their individuality – criticism and rational thought – there is the emergence of primitive, paranoid forms of thinking (Vogel, 2000).

Vogel (2000, p. 24) contends that anxiety that arises from conflictual social contexts (external) “combines” with “psychotic anxiety” evoked in group membership, leading to these regressive paranoid defenses. Members of an in-group then collude unconsciously to project onto the out-group their own bad internal objects. These are given ‘objective existence’ in the social structure (Menzies Lyth, 1988, cited in Vogel, 2000), manifesting in splitting, hostility and suspicion. Vogel (2000) cites Menzies Lyth (1988, 1989) as saying that these group relations may become institutionalised in permanent organisations such as businesses, welfare etc., such as the organisation of societal institutions around Apartheid in South Africa.

While shame is named as one of the ‘social emotions’ it is also of importance to Vogel (2000) and Scheff (1994a) because the presence of it (shame) is seen to signal weak bonds that are further threatened through engulfment or isolation, since intersubjectivity has been based on splitting and projection. Shame, however, is often denied, as it is indicative of being humiliated and/or threatened, which leads to anger. Unacknowledged shame may result in a shame-anger-shame feedback loop. Vogel points to the contentious conclusion that “cultural identities tend to be underpinned by internal phantasy...” (Vogel, 2000, p. 24), thus that situations and out-groups are not seen in realistic terms.

Young (1993) supports this contribution of psychoanalysis in understanding the mechanics of racism directed towards a particular group of people as articulated in the process of (projection and) projective identification. This can be made to account for the aggression directed towards an other. The question of why a *particular* other, arises. Young argues for an understanding of group processes in a particular geographical and historical site that makes racism historically and culturally contingent. He believes that the price of admission into a culture is the acquiring of its projective identifications (Young, 1993). Sander L. Gilman (1993) provides a view of how the shameful Jewish identity of late 19th century and early 20th century Europe influenced Sigmund Freud in the development of psychoanalysis and as instructing the boundaries of his thinking in his self-analysis.

Gilman (1993) points out that around the late 1800s and early 1900s the picture of the Jew suffering from mental illness was salient. The causes of their illness was not considered as exogenous (in, for example, their transition from East to West European lifestyle which included greater involvement in competition, free trade and other cultural pressures), but were considered to be endogenous (inherent to having been born Jewish, with a Jewish psyche). Studies of the

time (Czermak, 1857 and Budul, 1914, cited in Gilman, 1993) that concluded that rates of mental illness was higher in the Jewish population, did not, for example, account for this as arising of exogenous factors such as the social upheaval of World War I. Gilman (1993) ascribes this to the racist and classist belief of the latter half of the 19th century. This was that Jews had a predisposition for certain forms of mental illness due to “inbreeding”; highlighting the “confusion” between what constituted incest and what endogamous marriage (Gilman, 1993, p. 107). The point is well made: that amongst the learned physicians and psychological community “(t)he confusion of endogamous marriage with incestuous inbreeding was a result of the desire of scientific discourse to have categories circumscribing the explicit nature of the Other” (Gilman, 1993, p. 107). Even when exogenous causes were claimed the racial psychiatry of the time postulated their effects as operating on an already susceptible Jewish psyche, these factors contributing to the representation of the “self-hating Jew” (Gilman, 1993, p. 109). To preserve their sanity they shouldn’t mix, was the thought following. Gilman also ponders a view of the time which considered how much the Jews as a people with a “collective neurosis” had this as a result of “the loss of connectedness (to the Holy Land)” (Kirsch, 1934, in Gilman, 1993, p. 110).

The argument between Freud and one of his contemporaries, Lewisohn, about whether this “self-hatred”/neurosis was due to the fact that Jews were viewed as inferior because they were “more sensitive, critical” of themselves, is reminiscent of a more recent examination in the work of Frantz Fanon (1991). Around the notion of internalised oppression, the “native”, in confrontation with the “settler” is in a heightened state of arousal, vigilant to the attempt to degrade, with the displacement of an inevitable “armed resistance to colonialism” into a “fraternal bloodbath” amongst “natives” themselves (Fanon, 1991, p. 53, 54). In Gilman’s (1993) work is an account of the shaming particularised to a racialised identity in the rhetoric of a lack, loss, inferiority, degradation and in the neurosis and self-hatred of a people seen as a collective.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

A. A REVIEW OF RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS: IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

1. MEASURES OF SHAME

Of import to note here is that there has been a differentiation made between 'state' (shame in the moment) and 'trait' shame (dispositional proneness to feeling shame) in determining whether people are more likely to report feeling shame (Tangney, 1996). However, the distinction is also important for determining how emotion is assessed and which measurement tool would be appropriate for this work. Tangney (1996) has produced a valuable overview of the usefulness of such measures.

i. 'Trait' Measures

Tangney (1996) argues that measuring only one construct i.e. either shame or guilt, does not take into account the differences and overlap between these two emotions (e.g. in the Buss-Durkee Hostility-Guilt Inventory; The Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory; the Trait Guilt Scale of Guilt Inventory, the Situational Guilt Scale, or the Internalized Shame Scale). In the use of such singular constructs in the assessment of guilt there has also been considerable confounding of guilt feelings with moral beliefs.

Measuring both shame- and guilt-proneness, measures look into shame- vs. guilt-inducing situations based on the premise that there are significant differences in the types of situations that are guilt-eliciting or shame-eliciting. As has been discussed above, this has been challenged (Niedenthal et al, 1994). Also, global adjective lists have been found to rely too heavily on using the actual construct 'guilt' in the items themselves (e.g. Personal Feelings Questionnaire). Tangney (1996) further takes issue with the fact that checklists employ the individual in a shameful task – that of making global ratings about the self outside of a situational context.

In scenario-based measures respondents are presented with a series of specific, common day-to-day situations and are required to rate on a five-point scale the likelihood of their responding in each of the ways indicated. The responses capture affective, cognitive, and behavioural features that are associated with shame and with guilt. This allows for the fact that respondents may

experience both shame and guilt in relation to any of the scenarios. In the study of shame, these measures are advantageous in that respondents are not required to engage with abstract conceptions of 'guilt' and 'shame' that appear to be confusing to the lay person. Also, it is believed less likely to arouse defensive responses that is so encouraged with forced-choice/checklist-type items that require respondents to "bluntly acknowledge global tendencies to experience shame and guilt" (Tangney, 1996, p. 748)

Limitations to using scenario-based techniques, of which the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner and Gramzow, 1989, Tangney, Burggraf and Wagner, 1995) is one, include the fact that reliability is underestimated in these measures because of the situational variance of this approach. As a result, there appears to be lower internal consistency estimates of reliability than for adjective checklist measures, though test-retest reliabilities tend to be higher. A second limitation to scenario-based measures is the limited range of shame- and guilt-inducing situations. Tangney (1996) finds that less common, more idiosyncratic events and more serious transgressions in a specific area are not assessed as these techniques are more concerned with generalised tendencies to experience shame and guilt across a broad range of everyday situations (Tangney, 1996, p. 741).

Tangney (1996) also acknowledges that there may be some confounding of shame-proneness and guilt-proneness, with evaluation of moral standards. Though the distinction between affect and moral standards and beliefs has been made, it is impossible to ignore the fact that one is hardly likely to feel guilt, for example, if an act did not violate one's standard for conduct. Tangney (1996) warns against taking this as a reference for discarding such phenomenological exploration, as it is not possible to assess 'pure' forms of affect divorced from phenomenological experience. Tangney (1996) argues that in the TOSCA they have tried to address this concern by focussing on phenomenological descriptions of shame and guilt experience, rather than cognitive evaluations of whether behaviour is 'right' or 'wrong'. They have also attempted to avoid clearly controversial behaviour on which there is more likely to be moral evaluation, such as abortion, premarital sex, etc.

Cook (1987) admits to the very critique that Tangney (1996) expresses of self-report measures; viz., that the method engages the individual in a shame-inducing situation, which she (Tangney) objects to on humane ethical grounds (as compared to the possible influence on psychometric properties). Cook (1987), for example, accedes that the acknowledgement of a loss of control (as

an important aspect of the shame experience), is indeed a shame-inducing admission and may lead the respondent down the path of defensive denial. However, the clinician who bears this in mind will find this diagnostic and, according to Cook (1987), will be in a better position to acknowledge shame in the clinical setting once it has been identified and labelled. This to the effect of facilitating the therapeutic work of, for example, discussing the ISS results with the individual and engaging with how patterns of behaviour maintain shame feeling and what work needs to be done in order to challenge this.

ii. 'State' Measures

Much less research has been expended on measuring shame as it happens in the moment; i.e. 'state' shame. Izard's Differential Emotions Scale (Izard, 1977) is cited by Tangney (1996) as the most widely used measure of state shame and guilt. Various forms of the measure exist, some concentrating on descriptive words that indicate the emotions, and others using clusters of emotion words that are closely related. The respondent is required to rate these on a five-point scale as an indication of current feeling state. Tangney (1996) is concerned with the fact that shame and embarrassment is merged in one cluster while they may be even more distinct from each other than shame and guilt (Tangney et al, 1996a, cited in Tangney, 1996). Tangney herself has attempted to address this through the development of the State Shame and Guilt Scale (Marschall, Sanftner, and Tangney, 1994, cited in Tangney, 1996).

iii. Narrative Accounts

Lewis, in 1971, attempted to score references to adverse criticism, abuse and moral condemnation as guilt markers, and references to ridicule, inadequacy, shame, embarrassment, humiliation as shame markers using a coding system developed by Gottschalk and Gleser (1969). Reliability and validity for this technique has been low. Though it appeals as a measure for assessing shame in personal narrative accounts of real life experience and in assessing transcripts of interpersonal exchange, attempts to engage with emotions of shame and guilt in this way have been abandoned (Tangney, 1996). It may be useful, in the light of the development and refinement of measures of guilt and shame, taking into account a critical review of these measures, and the increase in our knowledge of how these emotions function; to pick up the strain of narrative research into shame and guilt.

2. MEASURES OF 'RACIAL'/SOCIAL IDENTITY AND COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM

i. The Racial Identity Attitude Scale

There appear to be few reliable and valid measures of 'racial'/social identity and collective self-esteem. A literature review indicates that The Racial Identity Attitude Scale (RIAS) is one instrument that has been extensively used to examine racialised experience of psychological constructs (see Tokar and Fischer, 1998, for references to the relevant research). Fischer, Tokar, and Serna (1998), for instance, contend that the RIAS is likely to be the instrument of choice in future research on African American racial identity development. It is useful to consider why it has not been adapted for this research.

The scale is based on Cross' (1995, 1978, 1971) 4-stage model of development of race-related worldviews. It may be seen in the different stages of:

- i) *Pre-encounter*, where there is a tendency to embrace Euro-American worldviews and devaluing African American worldviews,
- ii) *Encounter*, where African American worldviews are challenged by critical personal experience and the individual is motivated to reevaluate existing worldviews and to become more receptive to different worldviews, searching for a new cultural identity,
- iii) *Immersion-Emmersion*, characterised by psychological withdrawal from Euro-American culture and immersion into African American culture where 'blackness' is idealised and 'whiteness' is denigrated, and
- iv) *Internalization*, where the African American individual has resolved the conflict between African American and Euro-American values and exhibits a more secure and confident identity.

(Tokar et al, 1998).

▪ Validity and Reliability

Some support has been found for the factorial validity of the Preencounter, Immersion-Emmersion and Internalization subscales, but not for the Encounter subscale (Ponterotto and Wise, 1987, and Yanico, Swanson and Tokar, 1994, in Tokar et al 1998). These studies also found that

very few respondents endorsed high levels of Preencounter attitudes or low levels of Internalization attitudes, apparently indicating a restricted range of responses.

The RIAS-Long Form was developed to improve on this, but Tokar et al (1998) conclude; "...results at the item, subscale and structural levels indicated little psychometric support for the instrument (see Tokar, et al, 1998, for a full discussion). Specifically, item and reliability analyses indicated that for the Encounter scale, items were not measuring any of the 'black' racial attitudes posited by Cross (1995). It is then encouraged that future researchers modify one or more of the subscales to develop new measures of "Black racial identity development" (Tokar, et al, 1998, p. 6). Also, that consideration be taken of the "classically self-hating" and those for whom it appears that 'race' is not particularly salient (Cross, 1995, p. 97, cited in Tokar et al, 1998, p. 6). Tokar et al (1998, p. 7) further concede that the difficulty of developing sound psychometric instruments with regard to racial identity is the "recycling" and "cumulative nature" of its composition.

Further, the use of the scale is problematic in that it is interchangeably referred to as the Black Racial Identity Attitude Scale (see Nghe and Mahalik, 2001), which may be alienating to individuals who ascribe to a 'mixed' identity and might view this as an essentialising of racial identity and 'blackness'. It is the case that this scale may be used with different racialised groups to determine attitudes to 'black' people, while other research has also been conducted, for example, to measure attitudes to 'whiteness' through the development of the White Racial Identity Attitude Scale (see, Lemon and Waehler, 1996). However, the difficulty with naming and revising the instrument hints at ideological issues that have informed the othering of "blackness" in particular and sits uneasily with the intent of this research.

B. CURRENT METHODOLOGY

1. PARTICIPANTS

In this research participants were undergraduate psychology students at the University of Cape Town and the University of the Western Cape.

2. INSTRUMENTS

i. The Internalized Shame Scale (ISS)

In 1987 Cook described the Internalized Shame Scale, a development on Ehrich's (1985) attempt to measure internalised shame in a clinical population. The original 90-item scale could be divided into two: childhood shame-inducing experiences in interaction with parents; and statements directly describing an experience of feeling shame. The childhood scale items did not correlate highly with the total score of the items on the adult scale and it was decided to eliminate the childhood scale items and develop the adult scale. The scale was reduced to 39 items and administered to 367 college undergraduates and it appeared that the ISS was a reliable and valid measure of shame (Bauer, 1986 in Cook, 1987).

The ISS has become a single-factor test, providing a raw score that may be used clinically as well as a percentile conversion, for comparative purposes. High scores (above 50) indicate that the individual is reporting frequent levels of painful affect of the self. Cook (2001, p. 12) considers that low scores "do not necessarily indicate that the person has a high or positive self-esteem... (or) that the person does not have problems related to internalized shame", though. The 6 positively worded items are present to lessen the problem of a response set developing and are taken from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). It is not, however, intended as an independent measure of self-esteem built into the ISS (Cook, 2001).

▪ Administration

The ISS may be administered to individuals whose mother tongue is English and it should be clear that the meaning of the items are understood where administration is made to non-mother tongue English-language users. This paper-and-pencil test takes 15 minutes to administer and

may be administered in a group, or individually to persons from the age of thirteen years. The instrument requires respondents to rate on a 5-point Likert-type scale where 1 = Never, 2 = Seldom, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Often, 5 = Almost Always. For the purpose of ease of administration using multiple choice question answer sheets that were computer-scanned, the scale points were changed from '1-5' to 'A-E'.

The manual claims that the ISS has become the primary psychometric instrument for empirical research on shame. Cook (2001) has stated that the ISS may be used diagnostically in therapeutic work where it may be used to understand defense mechanisms in a particular identified group, or may be used as a screen, also useful on second administration as an indication of progress after treatment intervention (Cook, 2001).

▪ **Validity and Reliability**

The items in the ISS are all derived from the phenomenology of feelings and emotions that are accepted in current shame literature. The version used in this research had, up till this point (1987), been administered to fairly large college/adult populations (603 and 198 participants respectively), with a much smaller clinical population (64), with the samples being noticeably predominantly 'white'. Cook (1987) administered the scale to a large nonclinical sample of college students and adults, and a small clinical sample, which included individuals with alcohol-related problems, in order to assess validity and reliability of this measure of shame. This was also undertaken to assess the usefulness of the scale with regard to explicating the relationship between shame and addiction. In the third version of the test the remaining childhood items were removed and three new items written. Internal consistency reliability coefficients were high (.95, .95 and .93).

Between all three groups females reported higher levels of internalized shame than males. With the concurrent application of the Problem History Questionnaire and the Family of Origin Questionnaire, Cook was able to show with factor analysis of the Internalized Shame Scale, that the feeling factors of "fragile and out of control", and "empty and lonely" were the most important in contributing to the development and maintenance of addiction and emotional distress for both clinical and non-clinical groups (Cook, 1987). Cook (1987, p. 211) goes on to say that "(t)he ISS also appears to account for more of the variance of emotional problems than of addictions", hinting at the enormous psychological sequelae of internalised shame. Cook (1987)

considers these results as indicative of the scale's validity and importance in highlighting the relationship between high levels of shame and addiction, suggesting the therapeutic implication that it is the break in the shame cycle that may disrupt an addictive personality.

Rybak and Brown (1996) state that an advantage of the ISS is that the focus is on shame as an internal trait (enduring and generalised), rather than a state-focussed measure, considering ever-changing states, (without saying why this is an advantage, and under which circumstances this is more applicable). Rybak et al (1996) looked at the internal reliability and construct validity of the ISS; using both clinical and nonclinical populations. In 1996 they used the 1989 version of the ISS, then a 30-item test instrument with two basic scales; Shame and Self-Esteem, with Shame consisting of the subscales of Inferiority and Alienation. Rybak et al's (1996) hypothesis that a negative relationship would be found between Shame and Positive Affect (applying the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List-Revised (MAACL-R)), was confirmed. Significant positive correlation was found between shame and measurements of anxiety, depression, and hostility (constructs which have theoretically been linked with shame and which were also measured in the application of the MAACL-R). These results appear to endorse the construct validity of the scale and appear to be able to discriminate between clinical and non-clinical populations.

ii. Racialised Identification: A measure of social identity and collective self-esteem

Based on the premise that collective aspects of self-concept are an important determinant of much social behaviour Riia Luhtanen and Jennifer Crocker (1992) have attempted to operationalise this in the measure of Collective Self-Esteem. Factor analysis of the measure supports 4 subscales: Membership Esteem, Public Collective Self-Esteem, Private Collective Self-Esteem, and Importance to Identity, all of which represent aspects of SIT's construction of social identity. This denotes aspects of 'race', ethnic background, religion and feelings of belonging in one's community, given that social identity is both determined by an own evaluation of one's group as well as whether this is valued by those outside of one's group. The scale is of particular value for this research because of the authors' focus on identities that have been ascribed, as these identities (in their 'given' nature such as gender, religion, socioeconomic class), apply to all individuals - artefacts that have been seen to be relatively stable. Furthermore, interest in acquired identities would have confounded social identity with personal identity (Luhtanen et al, 1992).

The CSE has been augmented with additional items taken from Bornman's (1988) scale which measures "the degree of identification with the ingroup, positive or negative feelings associated with group membership, and attitudes toward the preservation of group identity" (Bornman and Mynhardt, 1991, cited in Holtman, 2002). These may be seen to cover similar aspects of membership, public and private self-esteem, and importance to identity, which is covered in the above scale.

Items from both scales have been changed to ask respondents to reflect on 'racial' identity, rather than social group (Luhtanen, et al, 1992), or ethnic, (Bornman, 1988) identity. For ease of report, the combined scale will be referred to as the Strength of Racial Identification Scale.

▪ **Administration**

The instrument is a paper-and-pencil measure that requires respondents to rate on a 5-point Likert-type scale where A = strongly disagree, B = disagree, C = neutral, D = agree, E = strongly agree.

▪ **Validity and Reliability**

The 16-item CSE instrument was scaled down from its original 43-items administered to 82 subjects. Luhtanen et al (1992) retained 4 items each of the above subscales. Items retained under each subscale had the highest loading on the appropriate factors (i.e. loadings greater than .70 for all items except two), with all item correlation to the appropriate subscale score at $r = .55$ or higher. Average item-total correlation ranged from .55 to .75.

Luhtanen et al (1992), in their administration to approximately 1 200 introductory psychology students (91.2% of whom were described as white, 3.6% black and 5.2% Asian), found that the scale and its 4 subscales were internally consistent. The Collective Self-Esteem Scale showed a moderate correlation with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1965) and the measure of discrimination perception. The Membership subscale (evaluation of the self in one's social group) of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale showed the highest correlation with Personal Self-Esteem, as predicted (Luhtanen et al, 1992).

Other findings included that; a belief that discrimination occurred, correlated negatively with Collective Self-Esteem. Luhtanen et al (1992) found that 'whites' reported higher levels of Public Collective Self-Esteem, and also reported higher total Collective Self-Esteem than either 'blacks' or Asians. Collective Self-Esteem also showed a moderate correlation with measures of group-orientation, as with Hui's (1988) Individualism-Collectivism scale (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992).

▪ Limitations

A concern has been that the focus on a "general, cross-group tendency" (Luhtanen et al, 1992, p. 304) of the CSE Scale to identify positive social identity does not comment specifically on gender or, for these purposes, 'racial' collective self-esteem. As such, collective identity may be viewed in relation to personal salience and so may differ between individuals from their occupational status to their 'racial' status, for example. For this purpose, Luhtanen et al (1992) propose that minor alterations to the instructions and wording of the items be made for the specific purpose of such investigations.

Keeping in mind that defensive responding may be evoked in light of the nature of this research it is useful to consider Luhtanen et al's (1992) findings from the simultaneous administration of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale and the Social Desirability Scale (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964). They found that none of the subscales of the total scale of CSE correlated significantly with the Social Desirability Scale; therefore, that the Collective Self-Esteem scale is "unrelated to the tendency to describe oneself in favorable terms and to possible response biases due to social desirability" (Luhtanen et al, 1992, p. 310).

▪ Implications

It may be argued that collective self-esteem moderates the extent to which individuals attempt to protect or enhance their collective identities. This suggests that low collective self-esteem individuals will, when faced with threat, be more likely to advance in-group protective or indirect enhancement strategies than engage in competition with out-groups. This would mean changing the value attached to attributes possessed (or not) by the in-group so that they are seen in a positive light - a characteristic of individuals with high collective self-esteem (Luhtanen, et al, 1992). In this research the intersection of personal (private or interpersonal) identity and social

(collective) identity may be seen as an attempt to clarify how people view the social groups they belong to and whether this is correlated with a personal, internalised shame experience.

iii. Demographic Data

Participants were asked to fill in a demographic questionnaire.

According to census 1996 (Simelane, 2002/01), the people of South Africa can still be divided along 'racial' terms, making up the following percentages of the population: African (77,4%), white and coloured (11,0%), and Indian (2,6%). African people (read 'black'), however, did not form the majority of the population in the Northern Cape and the Western Cape, where 'coloured' people were more highly present in absolute numbers.

▪ 'Race' and Previous Employment, Monthly Household Income

Information about previous employment and monthly household income is relevant as a socioeconomic descriptor. Taking into account the fact that the majority of people who have been oppressed by a shaming Apartheid system suffered economic hardship, it would be useful to statistically describe the intervening effect that socioeconomic status has on the experience of shame. Also, higher level of socioeconomic status theoretically indicates a higher level of education (for this sample, this may be related to families of origin), that is instrumental in employing strategies for social change.

▪ 'Race' and Language

The majority of the population of the Western Cape speaks Afrikaans, with English and IsiXhosa as the next favoured languages. Language indicators reveal that the Western Cape has the second largest proportion of people who speak at least two of the official languages at home. (Simelane, 2002/01). In compiling demographic information in this research, the distinction between second language preferably spoken at home, rather than in the work/university context is made. This is done for possible exploration of whether imposed language use (i.e. using a language at university when it is not one's first- or second-preferred home language), may be correlated with shame. In a province where the majority of people are identified as 'coloured', and with an

Afrikaans language, the necessary usage of English at an English-language university and its relation to shame requires exploration.

▪ **‘Race’ and country of birth**

This is important as census 1996 revealed that more than half a million people were from SADC countries other than South Africa, with close to half a million coming from the rest of Africa, Europe, Asia, North, Central and South America, Australia, New Zealand and other countries. These numbers affect the student population at universities. Students who do not ascribe to any of the identities of interest will be picked up in the sample and need to be accounted for.

3. PROCEDURE

First, second, and third-year students at the University of Cape Town and the University of the Western Cape were requested to participate. They were approached in their lecture theatres at their usual lecture time. Participation was voluntary and respondents were asked to complete the ISS, the measure of social identity and collective self-esteem, provide demographic information, as well as to use the space provided on the question sheet in order to express how they felt about responding to the instrument.

4. RATIONALE

In South Africa with its fraught history of racialised relations, it would be extremely affect-laden to begin to investigate a ‘pathological psyche’ by qualitative means without first identifying whether this is a valid, significant subject for investigation. Acknowledging that a quantitative means of investigation also produces affect and emotion in relation to the tool used, this needs to be measured against study that shows that participants in affect research have difficulty in differentiating between shame and guilt. By responding to feeling states in a measure that has already been found to have high construct validity for ‘shame’, we are able to reduce speculation about whether the appropriate feeling state has been identified. At the same time, past research has indicated that there is a concern with the confounding not only of shame with guilt, but also that in linking feeling states with specific situations (which would become implicit in more qualitative research), there is the greater probability of eliciting feeling states that are affected by the moral evaluation of the situation (as these are influenced by numerous intervening variables

such as religion, socioeconomic class, culture, etc.). The primary focus of this thesis is on whether 'coloured' people have significant levels of shame. The use of the specific research instrument for shame is supported by its focus on *internalised* shame, which directly addresses the concern with a pathological 'coloured' psyche as a trait, rather than 'state' shame, which is more transient in nature. This is a significant difference that would be extremely difficult to separate out in qualitative research, but that has usefully been built into the current instrument for shame.

University of Cape Town

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

A. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

i. University

The scales were administered at the University of Cape Town (UCT) and at the University of the Western Cape (UWC), returning responses for 444 students. UCT provided 234 respondents, UWC 191. Seventeen respondents chose not to indicate which university they were from. Respondents had been presented with three options that included Stellenbosch University. Although the research was not conducted there, two students chose this option. Analysis of their responses indicated consistent selection of non-options and it was decided to exclude their data.

ii. Course

Most students were from the Psychology second year course (40.5%), with 40.0 percent from Psychology 1 and only 14.3 percent from Psychology 3. The percentage of non-respondents to this item was 5,2 percent.

iii. Sex

The overwhelming majority of respondents was female (74.7 %), with men contributing 21.5 % of the responses. The percentage of non-respondents to this item was 3.8.

iv. Marital Status

Only 9.5 percent of respondents were married, while 86.2 were not. Only 4 percent did not respond to this item.

v. 'Race'

The distribution over 'racial' categories was evenly spread. Only 17 respondents chose not to respond to this item, the relatively small percentage possibly indicating general openness,

alleviating some concern about defensive responding that occurs with research into ‘racial’ issues. The following table provides a breakdown of figures:

	Count	Percent
Black	131	29.63801
White	136	30.76923
Coloured	132	29.86425
Indian	11	2.48869
Other	15	3.39367
Missing	17	3.84615

Table 1. Frequency Table: ‘Race’

vi. Living Arrangements

The majority of respondents indicated that they lived in a familial household (60.6 percent). There appeared to be an even distribution of people living at UCT residence and in single accommodation (approximately 17 percent). An erratum occurred in the fact that respondents were not provided with the option of living at UWC residence. Thus, the former percentage might be a cumulative indication of both UCT and UWC respondents staying at university residences. On the other hand, respondents staying on UWC residence may be indicated by the percentage of missing responses, amounting to 5.4 percent of the responses. However, this is unlikely to have an impact on this data as respondents living in the familial household are clearly in the majority. This might be an indirect socioeconomic indicator (respondents with less financial means are more likely to stay with their families) that has bearing on susceptibility to shaming, as well as possibly indicating the importance of familial influence on the shaming experience.

vii. Previous Employment and Age

The relative youth of the sample is indicated by the breakdown in age: 85.5 percent between the age of 18-24 and 10 percent between the age 25-40. In keeping with this, 51.4 percent had never been employed previously, with only 5.2 percent having worked for 5 years or more.

The following percentages indicate poor response returns for the items. This occurred either because respondents chose not to answer these items or because they had been presented with more than five options while the MCQ answer sheet only allowed them five responses options.

viii. Monthly Household Income

Respondents with a monthly household income of less than R 1000.00 constituted 25.6 of those who responded. Respondents with a monthly household income of R 10 000.00 and more constituted 18.49 percent. Percentage of respondents was 53.8, with missing responses for 46.2 percent of the sample.

ix. Language Use

Only 15.04 per cent of those who indicated the language they most often used at home (total respondents=55.7 per cent) were Afrikaans. The majority of respondents indicated that they mainly spoke English at home (66.3 percent). We are unable to describe what cumulative percentage of respondents mainly spoke an indigenous African language, though only 13.8 percent of respondents spoke Xhosa, the third most used language in the province. These results are surprising, as one would expect a much larger percentage of first-language Afrikaans speakers since Simelane (2002/1) reports that the majority of the population in the Western Cape is 'coloured' and that Afrikaans is the most used language amongst this group. Applying accepted discourse about the role that 'coloured' people played in maintaining apartheid structures, it might be suggested that shame about the Afrikaans language as intimately connected with 'coloured' identity and collusion with apartheid oppression (du Pre, 1997), may account for this phenomenon. This will be tested in the analysis that follows.

Thirty-six per cent of the sample responded to the item regarding second language use. Though in the use of it as a second language Afrikaans speakers rose to 39.62 percent of those who responded, English still retained highest use even as a second language (45.91 per cent), with seSotho accounting for next highest usage (6.28 per cent).

x. Country of birth

Only 51.1 per cent responded to this item. As expected the majority indicated that they were from South Africa (84.07 per cent).

B. INTERNALIZED SHAME SCALE (ISS)

i. Reliability

Item-Total Correlation for the ISS (with reverse scoring for six self-esteem items) ranged between .43 (Item 15) to .72 (Item 27), indicating that reliability for this measure of internalised shame is high. However, this is slightly lower than correlation for a non-clinical sample ranging from .56 to .73, with a median correlation of .63, reported by Cook (2001). For this scale there was a mean of 33.05, *SD* 15.58 and a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient = .92 (*N* = 396), indicating good internal consistency.

ii. Hypothesis Testing

▪ *Correlation of Shame with Strength of Racialised Identification (CSE and Bornman Scale)*

Correlation of shame with strength of racial identification across all ‘race’ groups indicates poor correlation ($r=.18$). Similarly, there is negligible correlation between shame and racial identification for differently identified ‘racial’ groups; ‘black’ ($r=.18$), ‘white’ ($r=.23$), or ‘coloured’ respondents ($r=.16$).

▪ *Analysis of variance (ANOVA)*

ANOVA in order to determine whether the mean difference in internalised shame between the identified ‘racial’ groups was due to chance (non-significant) or systematic effect (significant), was done (Pretorius, 1995). This yielded a significant result. However, this result was skewed due to the small proportion of ‘Indian’ (2.5 percent) and ‘Other’ (3.4 percent) respondents, and it was decided to exclude them from the analysis. ANOVA was then done in order to determine whether there was a significant difference in levels of internalised shame between the three identified groups of ‘black’, ‘white’ and ‘coloured’. The summary table is shown below:

	DF	SS	MS	F	p
Race	2	748.5	374.2	1.567	0.209876
Error	396	94551.2	238.8		
Total	398	95299.7			

Table 2. ANOVA Summary Table: Shame for only ‘black’, ‘white’, ‘coloured’

This result indicates that

- i. there is no significant difference in levels of internalised shame across groups of students who identify themselves as ‘black’, ‘white’, or ‘coloured’, and,
- ii. there does not appear to be significantly higher levels of internalised shame for ‘coloured’ respondents than any of the other racially identified groups.

However, the following diagram does indicate the *trend* towards significantly different levels of shame for ‘coloured’ respondents.




Figure 1. Graph of cell mean plots: Shame total for only ‘black’, ‘white’, ‘coloured’,
F(2,396) = 1.5674, p = .20988

▪ *Analysis of Covariance for shame in 'coloured' group: (ANCOVA)*

There appear to be high levels of variance within the group of interest (i.e. those identifying as 'coloured') which may be accounted for by other 'social' variables which may indicate socio-economic status and thus mediate shame, such as University, Monthly Household Income or Language. ANCOVA, to determine the significance of this possible covariance, was done with each variable:

Results of this analysis for University: $F(1.130)=2.0043$, $p=0.15925$; Monthly Household Income: $F(4.71)=0.1199$, $p=0.97499$; and Language: $F(1.79)=0.4697$, $p=0.49512$, indicate that none of these variables significantly contribute to the amount of shame variance within the 'coloured' group.

C. STRENGTH OF RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SCALE (CSE and Bornman's Scales)

i. Reliability

Item-total correlation ranged from .32 (item 24) to .66 (item 8) for the entire scale, with only two questionably reliable items with correlations of .24 (item 7) and .25 (item 15) respectively. Item-total correlation with the CSE only showed increased reliability, with a range between .41 (item 11) and .67 (item 14), higher than that between .37 and .59 reported by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992). For this scale the mean was 57.16, SD 10.85 with a Cronbach's alpha = .79 ($N = 379$).

Exploratory factor analysis was carried out, specifying four factors, and supporting Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) evidence for a four factor loading for the CSE; *membership* esteem, *private* collective self-esteem, *public* collective self-esteem, and importance to *identity*. However, there was strong loading for some items on different factors than evidenced by Luhtanen et al (1992). Notably, however, there is no disparity between Luhtanen et al (1992) and the current research with regard to which items load on *Importance to Identity* – an important aspect of this research. (See appendix for factor loading.)

Exploratory factor analysis was carried out for the Strength of Racialised Identification Scale (CSE and Bornman's scale). Using the Kaiser criterion (1960), there appears to be support for a

five-factor model. This supports the underlying four factors of the CSE and indicates that the Bornman (1988) scale taps into the *public* collective self-esteem subscale of the CSE, as well as introducing a new factor. This latter may speculatively be seen to represent aspects of the *performance* of identity in an adherence to it; including customs, traditions, and taking action in respect of it, which can be seen as evidence of the strength of racial identification. The scree test (Cattell, 1966) supports this five-factor model. (See appendix for factor loading and scree plot).

ii. Hypothesis Testing

- *Difference in strength of racial identification across ‘race’ groups: ANOVA*

ANOVA was done looking at the possible significant effect of strength of racial identification for the three groups of ‘black’, ‘white’, and ‘coloured’ respondents. It appears that on the measure of racial identification there are significant differences between levels of racial identification for these groups; $F(2.392)=19.070$, $p<0.00004$, the lowest identification with an identified ‘race’ group occurring amongst ‘coloured’ respondents.




Figure 2. ANOVA showing effect of racial identification for ‘black’, ‘white’, and ‘coloured’, using Total Racial Identification Scale, $F(2.392)=19.070$, $p<0.00004$

The Tukey test was done in order to establish where the effect lies; i.e. *which* relationships were significantly different from each other by comparing each pair of conditions (Hinton, 1995). It appeared that there was no significantly different strength of racial identification between ‘coloured’ and ‘white’ respondents ($p=.062988$), with a significant difference between strength of identification between ‘black’, and ‘white’ respondents ($p=.000291$), and ‘black’ and ‘coloured’ respondents ($p=.000022$)

RACE	Black	White	Coloured
Black		0.000291	0.000022
White	0.000291		0.062988
Coloured	0.000022	0.062988	

Table 3. Differential relationships between strength of racial identification across ‘black’, ‘white’, and ‘coloured’, using Total Racial Identification Scale; $F(2.392)=19.070$, $p<0.00004$

Due to interest’s sake we decided to test which relationships were significantly different from each other on strength of identification across ‘black’, ‘white’, and ‘coloured’ groups on the subscale CSE only.

RACE	Black	White	Coloured
Black		0.038640	0.000022
White	0.038640		0.000041
Coloured	0.000022	0.000041	

Table 4. Differential relationships between strength of racial identification across ‘black’, ‘white’, and ‘coloured’, using CSE; $F(2.392)=24.317$, $p<0.00004$.

The results showed that there were significant differences between ‘black’ and ‘white’ respondents ($p=.038640$), ‘black’ and ‘coloured’ respondents ($p=.000022$, and ‘white’ and ‘coloured’ respondents ($p=.000041$) in strength of racial identification, on the measure of CSE.




Figure 3. ANOVA showing effect of racial identification for 'black', 'white', and 'coloured', using CSE, $F(2,392)=24.317$, $p<0.00004$.

▪ *Analysis of Covariance for strength of racial identification in 'coloured' group: ANCOVA*

Again it was necessary to account for the level of variance within our group of interest ('coloured' group), and ANCOVA with University, Monthly Household Income and Language as possible covariants within the Strength of Racial Identification Scale was done. None of these covariants appeared significant: University: $p=0.10431$; Monthly Household Income; $p=.05119$; Language: $p=.473628$. The above results suggest that the effect of Income on strength of racial identification for "coloured" respondents *tends towards* significance ($p=.05119$) only.

The same covariants were tested with ANCOVA using the CSE scale only and no significant influence for these covariants were found: University: $p=.11805$, Monthly Household Income: $p=.064518$, Language: $p=.606730$.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

THE CONTINUED SALIENCY OF RACIAL IDENTIFICATION IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

While it appears that strength of racialised identification with a 'coloured' identity does not have a significant relationship to shame, it is statistically observed that 'coloured' identity does bear poorer strength of racialised identification than does a 'black' or 'white' racialised identity. Accounting for this needs to evaluate the usefulness of a 'coloured' racialised identity in a post-apartheid South Africa. This can be done in the framework of Social Identity Theory (SIT); taking into consideration the role of initial in-group identification and the political production of 'colouredness', as well as the role of personal trauma and its relation to identity.

SIT has shown that initial levels of in-group identification have an impact on later identification under conditions where change might occur. Initial low in-group identifiers do not evince changes in identification under *prolonged* unstable conditions where improvement to the group status is uncertain. However, where change is *likely* to occur, initial low in-group identifiers are more instrumental than initially high in-group identifiers (Doosje, Spears and Ellemers, 2002). It would be speculative to contend that the currently observed low 'coloured' racial identification is due to *initially* low levels of identification. However, it may be the case that, post-1994, and with temporal shifts in the perception of change to the status attached to their identification, that 'coloured' people have been more instrumental than other groups in moving away from claiming an identity that has been racialised, i.e. more so than 'black' or 'white' groups in South Africa.

Relatedly, Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, and Barlow's (1998) research provides support for the suggestion that 'coloured' people have evinced instrumentality in terms of this identity. In contrast to Higgins' (1987) Self-Discrepancy Theory that suggests that actual/own versus ideal/other discrepancies resulted in proneness to shame, and that actual/own versus ought/own discrepancies resulted in proneness to guilt; Tangney, et al contend that self-discrepancies *of all sorts* would be more highly related to a tendency to experience shame than guilt, as feelings of shame involve global negative evaluations of the self. This means that if a case has been made for the apartheid-institutionalised shamed 'coloured' individual, that a current non-significant relationship with shame suggests that this group has been re-negotiating a non-shaming self-

standpoint that is in contrast with the intended standpoint of the 'other' who creates the shaming experience. This would entail negotiating discrepancies along the dimensions of the actual/ideal/ought self. It is therefore useful to consider how 'coloured' people may have managed their identity; possibly through social creativity strategies such as a change of comparison group, a change in the comparison dimension, or a re-evaluation of this identity (Tajfel, 1978, cited in Niens, Cairns, Finchilescu, Foster, and Tredoux, 2003).

A POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO CHANGE

In a review of apartheid-era 'coloured' political activity, it has been pointed out by Lewis (1987) that there has traditionally been a number of ways to politically engage around 'coloured' identity (see Literature Review chapter for a discussion on the agendas of the African People's Organisation, the African National Bond, Anti-CAD, and the Coloured Peoples National Union). This was accomplished through the disunity of groups in the political agenda of the 'coloured'. It was in stark contrast to the limited number of representations made of 'whiteness', for example, in the representation of the National Party as the stronghold for 'white' identity, and served to maintain the idea of the fragmented and ideologically confused 'coloured' person. This may be seen as a factor that may have led to initial low levels of identification as 'coloured'. However, with political change and change in the ideological positions (even seen as the depoliticization (Whittaker, 1995)) of political parties, fewer political homes have been constituted where there are explicitly divergent projects around 'coloured' identity. This has become limited in the same way that there are only a few *major* political parties that have come to claim the stronghold for representation of 'black' identity or 'white' identity, and organisation specifically around this. It is suggested that this political change has assisted to impede the fracture that those divisive political agendas around the 'coloured' psyche have caused in the past, and created greater flexibility around the move towards an identity that can be viewed as other than racialised.

Political and cultural dialogues that have attempted to reconcile 'colouredness' under the banner of nationalistic discourse that brooks no colour bar, has been the new colonisation of South Africa, though, led en force by the media. In this sense, South Africa has been addressing the otherness, the marginal and the shaming essentialist notion of the 'coloured', and attempting to subsume it under a rainbow nationalist discourse. (It has done much in order not to deal with the possibility that the 'coloured' experience might be different from other racialised identities.) This has been especially pertinent post-1994 democratic elections, which opened up the free market

system that supports a mass culture but which threatens to thrive at the expense of those 'working class' people who are still mostly represented along 'racial' lines (Whittaker, 1995). The poorer strength of racial identification amongst 'coloured' people may be viewed in this framework where the drive in a free market system towards individualism through social mobility strategies, results in a narcissistic preoccupation with the self. This serves to subsume political (and in South Africa this has traditionally been attached to 'racial') identity, under individual identity. However, this threatens to reproduce the racialised demographic of the class status quo, as these have been defined by levels of literacy, wages, etc., and maintains the "buffer for the privileged caste (as) it chains the daily routines of working class home life to the social theory of the 'free' market system and its consequences which are canvassed as natural and permanent" (Whittaker, 1995, p. 14). Though this narcissistic preoccupation may be seen as an attempt to gain individualised recognition in the face of the effects of globalisation, it can be seen to reify racialised oppression. In a statement by a 'black' youth in a report on **The politics of self** (Deane, 2003, p. 16), this is brought home:

"We are grateful for those who struggled for freedom but there is a natural move away from politics."

To address the danger of such circular patterns of oppression that may be shame-inducing, Whittaker (1995) finds that non-exploitative and democratic ways of being in horizontal household relationships are important. In other words there is a call for the personal to constitute ways of being that continue to be contingent on the political. It is therefore also necessary to think explicitly about the extent to which personal experiences of racial identification impact on the saliency of shame.

SHAME-INDUCING TRAUMA: ACCOUNTING FOR THE PERSONAL IN SOCIAL IDENTITY

It is suggested that this study has looked at the effect of the political (racialised identity) on the personal (the self-conscious experience of shame). This begs the inverse question of what effect the personal on the political when trying to make sense of the relatively poorer strength of 'racial' identification' in a group of people who identify themselves as 'coloured', compared to a 'black'- or 'white'-identified group. Grunebaum and Robins (2001), in a re-reading of political activist Zahrah Narkadien's Human Rights Violations testimony regarding her imprisonment by the

apartheid regime, see “colouredness at the centre of the breach of community as well as the desire for community” (p. 167), providing the starting point for such an analysis. In the context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s hearings they argue that the subjective experiences of people such as Narkadien’s, are displaced or silenced in the face of a collective identity (Grunebaum and Robins, 2001). Narkadien’s testimony, for example, shows that she was better able to manage solitary confinement when she still maintained affective and ideological links with her political comrades around a ‘black’ identity. It was when she was ‘betrayed’ by these comrades in her scapegoating because of her ‘colouredness’ that set her apart from them, that she experienced personal trauma that made the subsequent experience of solitary confinement traumatic. Grunebaum et al (2001) contend that it is the introduction of personal trauma that disrupts the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the ‘new’ South Africa’s attempt to subsume identity under that of a collectivist narrative. The introduction of personal trauma perhaps acts as one of the “limits of a political community” (Grunebaum, et al, 2001, p. 165).

Grunebaum et al (2001) assert the point that though Narkadien’s political identity centred on being African she experienced trauma only when she was confronted by her (‘black’) African comrades who ‘othered’ her because they did not really see her as an African. Also, in reading the script that Grunebaum et al (2001) provide, it can be noted that for Narkadien the tearful breakdown comes when she relates that it is her parents who have taught her to identify with an African ancestry over that of ‘colouredness’. Narkadien’s case calls forth the relationship between shamed identity and memory, and the creation of it by her parents - an older generation of people. What is the role of memory and its relation to the emotions attached to identity? One may argue that a recall of memory in relation to her parents occurs here, responsible for bringing forth the flood of emotion.

For Narkadien the important loss may be that of an identity that has been purposive and gave meaning to her suffering; but one also wonders at the affective experience of a loss of a specific identity that has been *made important and salient by parents*. This then begs the question of what memories attached to the emotional saliency of identity have been constituted for ourselves through our own experiences, and what part of identity is *given* to us in the narrative and memory of older generations? This may be put as: how does one recollect (one’s) ‘colouredness’? Who is responsible for the making of memory, and in this instance, the creation of trauma based on memory? An address of this should help to inform the dialogue directed by Grunebaum et al’s

(2001) assertion that a coherent memory is lost in the space between romanticized and uncertain notions; in the in-betweeness/uncertainty of 'coloured' lives.

It may be argued that there is a disjuncture in memory between the participants in this research and an older generation of 'coloured'-identifying individuals who suffered personal trauma and loss at the hands of the apartheid regime. Thus, that personal trauma is more likely to be attached to being 'coloured' for an older generation living during the years of institutionalised apartheid, with attendant shaming in this way. It is not likely that a younger generation has suffered greater painful consequences of apartheid legislation than an older cohort of the sample, which suggests that the production of memory for a younger generation of people who identify as 'coloured' people (though mediated by an older generation who recount narratives of personal trauma related to 'coloured' identity), might not need to understand their 'coloured' identities through the miasma of a persecuted and shamed racialised identity.

THE ADDRESS OF A 'NEW' 'COLOURED' IDENTITY IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURAL ARTEFACTS

How, then, may we speculate 'coloured' identity is being construed by a younger generation of people in South Africa? The above results from this study suggest that it is not so much a strong identification with 'race' that protects against shame but that there are other identifications that provide a more positive reading of 'coloured' identity than what has been expected in the light of discourse situating a shameful 'coloured' self. One arena for speculation may be the influence of a particularly *socio-cultural* aspect of 'coloured' identity, rather than a 'racial' aspect, that hints at the shifts in social identity that have occurred with a transition towards democracy in South Africa. This may be seen in the light of social identity theory where this group has taken on board cognitive alternatives to a collective *racialised* identity as a vehicle for social mobility.

Within social identity theory it is believed that strength of in-group identification or the move towards stronger in-group identification occurs when there is a perceived threat to one's group. The threat to the racialised 'black' group by apartheid laws created segregation in all areas of social existence. With specific reference to artistic expression in South Africa, Haupt (2001), notes that legislation that segregated artistic expression by colour, created the force to drive the production of plays and music specifically relevant to the 'black' experience (Haupt, 2001). With the advent of democracy there has been a sense of a privileging of 'black' experience over

'coloured' and the threat of marginalising 'colouredness' again (Haupt, 2001). Subsequently, a similar drive towards creative expression by 'coloured' people as a way of staving off marginalisation may be posited, post-1994.

With the address of an assumed marginal 'coloured' identity, there have been several creative attempts at addressing what 'coloured' people themselves are thinking, and doing about this, as well as how they are continuing to live valued 'coloured' lives. Within South African 'coloured' rap music post-1994, Haupt (2001) has argued that men have situated the continued racialised oppression of 'coloured' men in "the minds of female subjects" (Haupt, 2001, p. 184). However, it may be noted that in the arena of theatre (see, for example, **Meet Joe Barber, For Coloured Girls, At Her Feet**), it is women who have taken a strong political position rather than men, and disrupt situations of gendered oppression between 'coloured' people in this way. These productions may be seen to represent 'coloured' people as confronting negative stereotypical images of themselves, as well as situating their selves as multifaceted and contested in, for example, the tension in the drive to be seen as Muslim over 'coloured', 'mixed' over 'coloured', and as 'woman' over 'man'. The visibility of the 'coloured' subject through these artistic means may be one way in which the cultural and social aspects of living a complex 'coloured' life is addressed, eschewing reductionist, racialised views of 'coloureds' about themselves.

Speculating about why it is that the stated hypotheses of this research do not hold, as well as accounting for poorer strength of racial identification amongst 'coloured' people, has led to the suggestion that it may be that in the self-evaluative eye of 're-constituting', 're-making' rhetoric post-1994, there has been a push of this generation of 'coloured' selves toward instrumentality. In terms of Self-Categorisation Theory, this recalls the valued depersonalisation that Hogg (1996, cited in Billig, 2002), speaks of. In the same sense in which Pattison (2000), for example, considers how shame may be interrupted/disrupted; in the active pursuit of a society addressing the ways in which psychological and social processes attempt to introduce it.

LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

By virtue of the fact that there are negative findings, it has been possible to speculate about the reason for this. By limiting identification to racial identification it is likely that this research misses out on attributes that are important to 'coloured' people's sense of their selves. However,

it was the intent of this research to investigate 'racial' identification and shame. Thus, it may also be that in employing a vocabulary that centres around 'race', we are employing a language that, in the contemporary 'rainbow' South Africa, many 'new' South Africans would balk at.

Though there is support for the use of a sample comprising university students, the study of shame in a 'coloured' group within South African society might have better benefited from a sample that is representative of those in this identified group who might, theoretically, be more at risk of shaming experiences. This alludes to 'coloured' people who, for example, have fewer alternatives to social mobility as they are restricted by economic class. In sampling university students we are looking at individuals who by virtue of a tertiary education have put into practice social mobility and social creativity practices and who, in the process of their everyday lives, are engaged in cognitive *and emotional* alternatives to prescriptive ways of being, through this interaction. Theoretically, this reduces the likelihood that they would have significant experiences of shame.

A limitation to the generalizability of the results accrued from poor planning that had participants responding to items on monthly household income (item 63), language use (items 64 and 65), and country of birth (item 66), which were not attached to the answer sheet. Analyses of these data have been done without an adequate representation of the sample size that completed the ISS and the Strength of Racial Identification Scale, and needs to be interpreted with caution.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Accessing a more representative sample of people identifying as 'coloured' that may be found in, for example, a 'coloured' suburb, allows for a broader range of experience (university versus non-university students, first language Afrikaans-speaking versus English-speaking, difference in parental occupation, etc.) in this group, from which relationships may be drawn. This would be more representative of lived experience that is arguably very different from that of a sample of university students who, by the nature of their academic status and the universities they attend, can be considered to be relatively liberal. Situating the sample in a 'coloured' suburb may also provide us with an idea of the nature/important aspects of the identity that possibly buffer the experience of shame, such as socio-cultural artefacts, which is a suggestion arising from the statistical analysis of this study's data.

We have found **SIT** and the work around the importance of initial levels of in-group identification for cognitive alternatives and social mobility strategies, relevant to this study. This suggests that a measure of initial levels of in-group identification amongst the three racialised groups of interest would have assisted us to identify intermediate variables in the instrumentality of groups toward greater identification with the in-group. Factoring this in would assist us to understand under which socio-cultural and political conditions this does not play out. Appraisal of change is relevant to SIT, as well as to the experience of shame as shame centres on a changeable evaluative aspect of the self, which differs with time. Thus, a temporal study is called for.

Related to this, future research into the shaming experience that is connected with racism, should include xenophobia and related forms of intolerance. This is particularly pertinent taking into account processes of globalisation while South Africa experiences an influx of refugees from other African countries (Niens, et al, 2003). It would be both interesting and relevant to consider temporal changes in a shaming experience for individuals entering South Africa who are exposed to xenophobia or carry with them a refugee status. Determining changes to experiences of shame as these identified groups become more or less integrated into South African society, (determined through perceptions of permeability, stability and legitimacy), would go further towards explicating the role between the individual and social psychology that takes into account psycho-socio-political change.

It is the nature of quantitative research that the subject under investigation may be removed from its location within the psycho-socio-political framework from which it derives its rationale. At the risk of this, however, for this author it has been impossible to justify the qualitative study of shame related to 'coloured' identity (through, for example, discourse analysis), without first addressing whether there is a need to do so. It is felt that a qualitative analysis of this matter may be better done within the context of research that serves to limit the social and political extrapolations that may occur to reify the pathologising and marginalising of a 'coloured' identity. With this framework in place it is perhaps now more useful to understand the psychodynamics of processes of shaming related to the racialisation of 'coloured' identity for those for whom this is salient, and may be done through a more qualitative method of study.

CONCLUSION

The above study was an attempt to address the validity of discourse around a shameful 'coloured' self, arising from South Africa's history of apartheid segregation that ostensibly left 'coloured' identity in a marginal position, struggling with the 'in-betweenity' of experience that is neither 'black' enough nor 'white' enough. A sample of university students was selected because of the convenience of this sample but also because of the historically different 'racial' demographic profile that might emerge from the University of Cape Town and the University of the Western Cape. It was also necessary to determine whether shame was a relevant experience for younger persons, considering the sequelae of addictive behaviours that arise from a process of shaming, and the impact on South African society, as well as the fact that younger people will increasingly occupy leadership roles in shaping a democracy that might, in its all-encompassing project of reconciliation, overlook the 'marginal'. An experience of shame might result in a feedback loop that reinforces shame.

The results from this study indicate that university students who ascribe to a 'coloured' identity *do not* experience significantly different levels of shame than students who ascribe to a 'black' or 'white' racialised identity. This does not support the discourse that situates the 'coloured' individual as marginal and evincing a shameful 'coloured' self. Neither does this experience appear to be mediated by socioeconomic status, in the indicators of which university they attend, monthly household income and home language use.

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University of Cape Town

APPENDIX

University of Cape Town

STATEMENT OF ETHICS

I, Hayley Julius, hereby undertake that the following holds with regard to the proposed research:

Prospective participants will be made aware that the data collection is for research purposes. Participation will be voluntary, with participants having been informed about the nature of the research. Confidentiality will be ensured as no names or student numbers will be requested. Participants reserve the right to withdraw consent at any stage of the research. The proposed instrument does not intend to create trauma but should individual participants require psychological input after the administration of this questionnaire the researcher undertakes to refer them to appropriate services.

Preconfirmation for the administration of this questionnaire will be sought from the University of the Western Cape and feedback will be given to the institution regarding the outcome of the study. The final results of the study will be made accessible to the university should it request this.

Hayley Julius

Colin Tredoux

Intern Clinical Psychologist

Research Psychologist (Supervisor)

SECTION A

Below is a list of statements describing feelings or experiences that you may have. Read each statement carefully and circle the number to the right of each item that indicates the frequency with which you find yourself feeling or experiencing what is described in the statement. Use the scale below. Try to be as honest as you can when responding. **Please answer all of the items on the pink MCQ answer sheet.**

Never	Seldom	Sometimes	Often	Almost Always
A	B	C	D	E
1.	I feel like I am never quite good enough.			
2.	I feel somehow left out.			
3.	I think that people look down on me.			
4.	All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a success.			
5.	I scold myself and put myself down.			
6.	I feel insecure about others' opinion of me.			
7.	Compared to other people, I feel like I somehow never measure up.			
8.	I see myself as being very small and insignificant.			
9.	I feel I have much to be proud of.			
10.	I feel intensely inadequate and full of self-doubt.			
11.	I feel as if I am somehow defective as a person, like there is something basically wrong with me.			
12.	When I compare myself to others, I am just not as important.			
13.	I have an overpowering dread that my faults will be revealed in front of others.			
14.	I feel I have a number of good qualities.			
15.	I see myself striving for perfection only to continually fall short.			
16.	I think others are able to see my defects.			
17.	I could beat myself over the head with a club when I make a mistake.			
18.	On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.			
19.	I would like to shrink away when I make a mistake.			
20.	I replay painful events over and over in my mind until I am overwhelmed.			
21.	I feel I am a person of worth at least on an equal plane with others.			
22.	At times I feel like I will break into a thousand pieces.			
23.	I feel as if I have lost control over my body functions and my feelings.			
24.	Sometimes I feel no bigger than a pea.			
25.	At times I feel so exposed that I wish the earth would open up and swallow me.			
26.	I have this painful gap within me that I have not been able to fill.			
27.	I feel empty and unfulfilled.			
28.	I take a positive attitude toward myself.			
29.	My loneliness is more like emptiness.			
30.	I feel like there is something missing.			

SECTION B

We are all members of different social groups or social categories. Some of such social groups or categories pertain to gender, ‘race’, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class. We would like you to consider your membership in a particular ‘**race**’ group or category, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about this group and your membership in it.

There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. **Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale:**

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
A	B	C	D	E
31.	I am a worthy member of the ‘racial’ group I belong to.			
32.	I often regret that I belong to the ‘racial’ group I do.			
33.	Overall, my ‘racial’ group is considered good by others.			
34.	Overall, my ‘racial’ group membership has very little to do with how I feel about myself.			
35.	I feel that I don’t have much to offer to the ‘racial’ group that I belong to.			
36.	In general, I’m glad to be a member of the ‘racial’ group I belong to.			
37.	Most people consider my ‘racial’ group, on the average, to be more ineffective than other ‘racial’ group.			
38.	The ‘racial’ group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.			
39.	I am a cooperative participant in the ‘racial’ group that I belong to.			
40.	Overall, I often feel that the ‘racial’ group of which I am a member is not worthwhile.			
41.	In general, others respect the ‘racial’ group that I am a member of.			
42.	The ‘racial’ group I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.			
43.	I often feel I’m a useless member of my ‘racial’ group.			
44.	I feel good about the ‘racial’ group I belong to.			
45.	In general, others think that the ‘racial’ group I am a member of is unworthy.			
46.	In general, belonging to a ‘racial’ group is an important part of my self-image.			
47.	Loyalty towards my ‘race’ group is particularly important to me.			
48.	It upsets me when other people speak negatively about my ‘race’ group.			
49.	Preserving the identity of my ‘race’ group is not very important to me.			
50.	I do not want to belong to any other ‘race’ group.			
51.	I should be willing to take action if the identity of my ‘race’ group is threatened.			
52.	I respect a person who takes pride in the special qualities of her ‘race’ group.			
53.	Commitment to the culture and traditions of my ‘race’ group is a major source of security in my life.			
54.	Protecting the customs of my ‘race’ group is unnecessary.			

SECTION C
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Please answer questions 55-62 on the pink MCQ answer sheet.

55. UNIVERSITY:

University of Cape Town	a
University of the Western	b
Cape Peninsula University	c

56. COURSE:

Psychology 1	a
Psychology 2	b
Psychology 3	c

57. AGE:

18-24	a
25-40	b

58. SEX:

Female	a
Male	b

59. MARITAL STATUS:

Married	a
Unmarried	b

60. RACE:

Black	a
White	b
Coloured	c
Indian	d
Other	e

61. LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:

Familial	a
Household	b
Single	c

62. PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT:

None	a
<1 year	b
1-3 yrs	c
3-5 yrs	d
>5 yrs	e

Please answer the following questions in the boxes provided below.

63. MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME:

<1000	a
1000-2999	b
3000-5999	c
6000-9999	d
10 000-14 999	e
15 000+	f

64. LANGUAGE MOST OFTEN USED AT HOME:

Afrikaans	a
English	b
IsiXhosa	c
Sesotho	d
IsiZulu	e
Setswana	f
IsiNdebele	g
Other African language	h
Other foreign language	i

65. IF YOU SPEAK MORE THAN ONE LANGUAGE AT HOME, WHICH IS IT?

Afrikaans	a
English	b
IsiXhosa	c
Sesotho	d
IsiZulu	e
Setswana	f
IsiNdebele	g
Other African language	h
Other foreign language	i

66. COUNTRY OF BIRTH:

South Africa	a
SADC countries	b
Rest of Africa	c
Europe	d
Asia	e
North America	f
Central & South America	g
Australia and New Zealand	h
Other	i

Any comments about what this was like for you?

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Thank you!

ALPHA COEFFICIENT FOR INTERNALIZED SHAME SCALE

	Mean if	Var. if	StDv. if	Itm-Totl	Alpha if
Shame1	31.39394	226.8145	15.06036	0.550968	0.922113
Shame2	31.54040	226.2130	15.04038	0.545357	0.922135
Shame3	31.77020	226.3992	15.04657	0.524983	0.922415
Shame5	31.57071	226.6086	15.05353	0.444357	0.923771
Shame6	31.35353	225.1629	15.00543	0.496777	0.922876
Shame7	31.71717	223.7635	14.95872	0.606777	0.921155
Shame8	32.17929	223.2330	14.94098	0.620984	0.920923
Shame10	31.83333	224.0177	14.96722	0.629095	0.920914
Shame11	32.16667	222.1793	14.90568	0.617536	0.920881
Shame12	32.06818	223.9373	14.96453	0.588427	0.921412
Shame13	31.66414	224.3140	14.97711	0.527900	0.922352
Shame15	31.31061	229.1586	15.13798	0.372714	0.924904
Shame16	31.41162	228.4240	15.11370	0.447757	0.923561
Shame17	31.64394	223.1586	14.93849	0.460422	0.923958
Shame19	31.39899	222.8761	14.92904	0.520141	0.922570
Shame20	31.29040	219.8020	14.82572	0.557807	0.922006
Shame22	31.55303	221.2219	14.87353	0.591389	0.921262
Shame23	31.96717	221.2742	14.87529	0.596532	0.921173
Shame24	32.22980	223.3941	14.94638	0.602704	0.921177
Shame25	31.93182	220.7807	14.85869	0.632154	0.920574
Shame26	31.51515	215.4568	14.67845	0.649770	0.920187
Shame27	31.81818	217.0730	14.73340	0.675656	0.919669
Shame29	31.66667	219.8131	14.82610	0.601689	0.921078
Shame30	31.22475	218.5530	14.78354	0.631699	0.920511

SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SCALE

Mean:	33.053030303	Sum:	13089.000000
Standard Deviation:	15.579106941	Variance:	242.70857307
Skewness:	.607385175	Kurtosis:	.097335444
Minimum:	2.000000000	Maximum:	88.000000000
Cronbach's alpha:	.924842693	Standardized alpha:	.925937138
Average Inter-Item Correlation:	.346215588		

ALPHA COEFFICIENT FOR
STRENGTH OF RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SCALE

	Mean if	Var. if	StDv. if	Itm-Totl	Alpha if
Race1	54.25066	105.7657	10.28424	0.472603	0.769601
Race2Rev	54.08443	107.3121	10.35916	0.408123	0.773220
Race3	55.03166	109.4871	10.46361	0.331060	0.777419
Race4Rev	55.76253	109.7747	10.47734	0.244759	0.782461
Race5Rev	54.45910	108.8868	10.43489	0.338396	0.776949
Race6	54.25594	104.9503	10.24453	0.518661	0.767185
Race7Rev	55.01319	112.9048	10.62567	0.137870	0.787807
Race8	55.05277	100.8099	10.04041	0.581107	0.761020
Race9	54.88654	106.2220	10.30640	0.499774	0.769000
Race10Rev	54.31398	108.5004	10.41635	0.379937	0.774978
Race11	54.80475	111.1703	10.54373	0.264855	0.780651
Race12Rev	55.21372	103.9464	10.19541	0.417484	0.771780
Race13Rev	54.13193	109.5077	10.46459	0.354373	0.776457
Race14	54.33773	103.8490	10.19063	0.633870	0.762385
Race15Rev	54.83377	112.8193	10.62164	0.153133	0.786586
Race16	55.18206	101.3943	10.06947	0.547657	0.763122
Race17	55.06596	103.7555	10.18605	0.520436	0.766117
Race18	54.38259	109.3127	10.45527	0.290154	0.779566
Race19	55.33773	127.0311	11.27081	-0.417611	0.817344
Race20	54.47229	109.1094	10.44554	0.306103	0.778658
Race21	54.79947	106.6142	10.32541	0.435461	0.771678
Race22	54.23747	108.1177	10.39797	0.428853	0.772945
Race23	55.04749	105.1534	10.25443	0.459667	0.769767
Race24	55.68338	126.0528	11.22732	-0.407205	0.813794

Number of items in scale: 24

Number of valid cases: 379

Number of cases with missing data: 63

Missing data were deleted: casewise

SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SCALE

Mean:	57.158311346	Sum:	21663.000000
Standard Deviation:	10.850657859	Variance:	117.73677598
Skewness:	-.108033072	Kurtosis:	-.130624640
Minimum:	25.000000000	Maximum:	84.000000000
Cronbach's alpha:	.785128522	Standardized alpha:	.787193565
	Average Inter-Item Correlation:		.137900605

**EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS:
SUPPORTING FOUR FACTORS FOR THE CSE SCALE**

	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4
Race1	0.585913	0.044923	-0.003483	0.369880
Race2Rev	0.426093	0.193679	0.025053	0.425856
Race3	0.339988	0.680882	-0.023269	-0.055434
Race4Rev	-0.171586	-0.003146	0.742510	0.203477
Race5Rev	0.117370	-0.015024	0.070042	0.796433
Race6	0.730423	0.074701	-0.039850	0.239671
Race7Rev	-0.063428	0.649806	0.036922	0.091179
Race8	0.563225	0.023159	0.541100	0.053552
Race9	0.682132	0.055296	0.170437	0.002434
Race10Rev	0.268205	0.310335	0.130015	0.380747
Race11	0.159576	0.743995	0.012621	-0.021329
Race12Rev	0.171806	-0.001813	0.769627	0.105974
Race13Rev	0.152029	0.013664	0.147086	0.710578
Race14	0.681132	0.159928	0.240659	0.199297
Race15Rev	-0.025612	0.787718	-0.055348	0.108644
Race16	0.430350	-0.011488	0.684683	-0.039529
Expl.Var	2.803552	2.231023	2.042992	1.780235
Prp.Totl	0.175222	0.139439	0.127687	0.111265

**FACTOR LOADINGS FOR FOUR FACTORS OF CSE
(LUHTANEN AND CROCKER, 1992)**

ITEM	FACTOR LOADING			
	Membership	Private	Public	Importance to Identity
1	.68			
2		.83		
3			.72	
4				.72
5	.76			
6	.40	.62		
7			.76	
8				.74
9	.55			.40
10	.36	.59		
11			.78	
12				.77
13	.75			
14	.44	.54		.30
15			.78	
16				.75

**EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS:
SUPPORTING FIVE FACTORS FOR THE STRENGTH OF RACIAL IDENTIFICATION
SCALE (CSE SCALE & BORNMAN'S SCALE)**

	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5
Race1	0.040864	0.088107	0.431499	0.531016	0.099834
Race2Rev	0.052036	0.185976	0.249636	0.532480	0.082682
Race3	0.037299	0.720704	0.220186	0.062610	0.000922
Race4Rev	0.700721	-0.058494	-0.101168	0.078765	-0.028289
Race5Rev	0.120439	-0.019856	-0.053744	0.764066	0.087091
Race6	0.076398	0.193513	0.515729	0.441901	0.127377
Race7Rev	0.086701	0.654896	-0.013721	0.084197	-0.240148
Race8	0.601593	0.082290	0.342383	0.225623	0.196470
Race9	0.367585	0.175943	0.473273	0.254727	0.019768
Race10Rev	-0.036803	0.283574	0.048760	0.353494	0.443065
Race11	-0.048468	0.757596	-0.009717	0.013310	0.230855
Race12Rev	0.708774	-0.007172	0.045081	0.101477	0.246447
Race13Rev	0.164878	0.000079	-0.012141	0.699032	0.123453
Race14	0.225988	0.224252	0.509699	0.352064	0.282146
Race15Rev	-0.051182	0.754252	-0.081431	0.081291	-0.018790
Race16	0.668521	0.051611	0.259303	0.070562	0.325091
Race17	0.523894	-0.039938	0.348892	0.041546	0.432940
Race18	0.165922	-0.190293	0.530635	-0.108332	0.236142
Race19	-0.223424	0.013924	-0.044842	-0.210410	-0.610514
Race20	0.002571	0.030161	0.671144	0.043584	-0.019986
Race21	0.166352	-0.096489	0.486210	0.012891	0.522901
Race22	-0.019023	-0.033953	0.464887	0.149424	0.561119
Race23	0.471905	0.004476	0.166562	0.051739	0.592231
Race24	-0.251154	0.021258	-0.013633	-0.090073	-0.707523
Expl.Var	2.721258	2.395756	2.591999	2.330124	2.705231
Prp.Totl	0.113386	0.099823	0.108000	0.097088	0.112718

Number of variables: 24
 Method: Principal components
 log(10) determinant of correlation matrix: -3.1571
 Number of factors extracted: 5
 Eigenvalues: 6.16177 2.58997 1.49430 1.36678 1.13155

SCREE PLOT OF FIVE-FACTOR MODEL FOR THE STRENGTH OF RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SCALE (CSE SCALE & BORNMAN'S SCALE)

